My research focuses on mechanism design, in particular, existence and construction of optimal mechanisms, competing auctions and mechanisms, as well as industrial organization theory. On the applied side, I have a keen interest in operations of water markets in developing nations, their further design and development.

I obtained my Ph.D. from Stanford University.

Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanism and Surplus Allocation.
(with Grigory Kosenok)
Journal of Economic Theory, 140, 2008, pp. 126-161.

Mechanism Design with Partial State Verifiability.
(with Raymond Deneckere)
Games and Economic Behavior, November 2008, 487-513.

Investment Tournaments.
(with Michael Schwarz)
Journal of Labor Economics, October 2010 Vol. 28 (4), pp. 893-922.

Multidimensional Screening: A Solution to a Class of Problems.
(joint with R. Deneckere)
mimeo (2012)

Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission.
(joint with Rossella Argenziano and Franesco Squintani)
mimeo (2013)