Sergei Severinov

Associate Professor

My research focuses on mechanism design, in particular, existence and construction of optimal mechanisms, competing auctions and mechanisms, as well as industrial organization theory. On the applied side, I have a keen interest in operations of water markets in developing nations, their further design and development.

Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanism and Surplus Allocation.
(with Grigory Kosenok)
Journal of Economic Theory, 140, 2008, pp. 126-161.

Mechanism Design with Partial State Verifiability.
(with Raymond Deneckere)
Games and Economic Behavior, November 2008, 487-513.

Investment Tournaments.
(with Michael Schwarz)
Journal of Labor Economics, October 2010 Vol. 28 (4), pp. 893-922.

Multidimensional Screening: A Solution to a Class of Problems.
(joint with R. Deneckere)
mimeo (2012)

Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission.
(joint with Rossella Argenziano and Franesco Squintani)
mimeo (2013)

Winter 2021
No ECON course(s) were found for W2021 term.