# Gender, Social Recognition, and Political Influence\*

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#### Abstract.

What determines women's political influence? While the literature on political engagement focuses on individual traits, attitudes, and participation, we argue that how these factors translate to political influence is fundamentally a *social* process that requires recognition from the broader community, with important implications for women's influence. Using new data on networks of political influence in Philippine villages, we show that even after controlling for socioeconomic status or political participation, women are still markedly less likely to be recognized as influential. Furthermore, we show that the commonly understood factors that correspond to political influence apply primarily to men, and that for women, the determinants of influence are more complex: embeddedness in the community and participation in community activities are more important than connections or wealth. In addition, we highlight important mechanisms of political influence for women and key limitations for how women can use their social networks for political ends.

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#### 1 Introduction

What does it mean to be politically influential? Political influence is often associated with large-scale interference in politics: kingmakers and back-room brokers, lobbyists interfering with policymaking, bribes and corruption, or states intervening in each other's affairs. This paper focuses on political influence at a much smaller scale: social persuasion and the ways that ordinary people can affect each other's political views and choices. While this sort of political influence is unlikely to make the news, when it comes to decisions of everyday people, influence that is exercised through social connections and persuasion may be just as important for understanding political outcomes. This is especially the case in low information environments, where voters rely on information from friends, family, and neighbors in order to make political decisions.

In this paper, we show that the specific processes and avenues to political influence are fundamentally different for men and women, and that this difference in social recognition is linked to gender gaps in political participation and engagement. The literature has tried to explain why women are less likely to join parties or participate in politics at various levels, but has not yet explored whether these political activities themselves are viewed through a gendered lens. What if the commonly understood traits and experiences that lead men to political efficacy and influence—previous experience, political connections, membership in political organizations—do not have the same effect for women?

An important contribution of our paper to the literature on gender is to bridge the divide between individual-level factors and societal outcomes for women by focusing on political influence. In contrast to individual-level factors, influence is inherently a social concept: to become influential requires recognition from the larger community.<sup>3</sup> As a result, our understanding of women's participation in politics has to similarly focus not only on women's individual traits and activities, but how those traits and activities are perceived by their broader communities and social networks.

We argue that it is this process of translating individual characteristics and actions into political influence that is itself gendered. In addition to any institutional barriers to political engagement and participation, women face a social or cultural barrier as well: they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See, e.g., Becker (1983); Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Di Tella (2006); Berger et al. (2013); Weymouth (2012); Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See, e.g., Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955); Huckfeldt and Sprague (1991); Mutz (1998); Bond et al. (2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>This framework was inspired by work on the science of success from the Barabási lab (see, e.g., Sinatra et al. 2016) and extensive research on the importance of social context for the political involvement of women and under-represented minority groups (see, e.g., Bedolla 2005; Pardo 1990).

are often expected to be more engaged and embedded in their communities, with greater social and familial responsibilities. Consequently, women's avenues to influence are fundamentally different and more complex. This is especially the case for women in many countries in the developing world: their prominence in the social sphere and in their communities means that these social networks and activities are key for political influence. By contrast, for men, there is a much clearer relationship between their participation in political activities and their levels of recognition from the community in the form of political influence.

We offer a new approach by exploring political influence within the community. We do this using a survey module in which villagers were asked to name the people in their village whose opinions are influential and respected when it comes to politics. This allows us to construct network-based measures of political influence. The detailed surveys were implemented in the Philippines shortly after the local elections in 2016, in the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur.

Using these data, we show that women are significantly less likely to be identified as politically influential, even when controlling for factors that we would expect to account for the difference, such as socioeconomic status, political engagement, or political activities. This difference stems from underlying differences in the way that these activities are perceived by the community. In particular, we show that while political engagement and political networks are indeed correlated with political influence, this effect holds only for men. Other than holding office previously, all of the other indicators of political engagement and networks—membership in political parties, attendance at village political assemblies, and connections to politicians—do not translate to greater political influence for women. In fact, some factors even have a negative effect on the perception of women's political influence. For women, the avenues towards political influence are more complex: embeddedness in the community and participation in community activities are more important correlates than political activities and participation.

Our work is related to several areas. As a starting point, this paper shares an approach with research emphasizing the importance of communities and social context for voting.<sup>4</sup> In applying these frameworks for understanding women's political influence, this paper draws from two extensive literatures: (i) social networks and political influence, and (ii) gender and political engagement. The literature on gender and politics explores the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See, e.g., Bedolla (2005) on Latino political engagement, Pardo (1990) on community activism among Mexican-American women, and Phillips and Lee (2018) on gender and immigration conditioning political participation.

determinants of women's political engagement and participation, highlighting features such as the institutional context (see, e.g., Lawless and Pearson 2008; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Jones and Navia 1999; Htun and Jones 2002; Krook and O'Brien 2010; O'Brien and Rickne 2016; Carroll and Jenkins 2001), individual-level determinants and attitudes (see, e.g., Kanthak and Woon 2015; Fox and Lawless 2011; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Bauer 2014), and experimental interventions to improve women's political engagement (see, e.g., Prillaman 2018; Karpowitz, Monson and Preece 2017).

Our work also complements the literature on social persuasion, pressure, and political engagement (see, e.g., Fafchamps, Vaz and Vicente Forthcoming; Ames, Baker and Smith 2016; Schaffer and Baker 2015; Marshall 0; McClendon 2014), in our focus on understanding how women become influential in their communities.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on gender, social networks, and political influence, and presents our theoretical framework. Section 3 addresses these issues in the specific context of the Philippines. Section 4 discusses the data and methodological approach. Section 5 presents results on the political influence of women and analyzes the differential factors that lead to influence for men and women. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

#### 2 Women and Political Influence

In contrast to the rich literature on gender and social influence, there is relatively less work on gender and political influence.<sup>5</sup> Much of the literature on women's political influence focuses on women as a group or voting bloc (see, e.g., Mueller 1991; Norris 1996). At the same time, there is widespread acknowledgement that women are less influential in politics and that this gender gap is problematic, both for normative and pragmatic reasons.

In this context, efforts to address this implicit gender gap in political influence focused on understanding women's political participation, with a view towards increasing the number of women holding political office. In terms of candidacy, Fox and Lawless (2010) find a wide gender gap for political recruitment: even qualified and well-connected women are less likely to be recruited to run for office than men in similar circumstances. Nor are women seeking office on their own: Preece, Stoddard and Fisher (2016) show that women were less likely to respond to recruitment efforts than men. Relatedly, using survey ex-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>For a review of the literature on gender and social influence, please see Carli (2002).

periments, Kanthak and Woon (2015) find that men and women volunteer for positions at similar rates, but when a position required an election, women's willingness to volunteer dropped from 82.2% to 50% even if the positions were identical. By contrast, men were willing to be considered for election at similar rates that they were willing to volunteer, suggesting that women are more risk averse, which translates to election aversion. Fox and Lawless (2011) similarly present evidence for greater "internal" barriers for women's participation using survey data. They find that even when men and women have similar professions, education, income, and levels of political interest, women are less likely to see themselves as qualified for political participation. These differences in perception could not be explained by differences in credentials or other factors, suggesting that many of the barriers to women's participation are perceptions-based. Schneider et al. (N.d.) high-light a psychological channel: that gendered views of what political power entails gives rise to the differences in political ambition between men and women.

Furthermore, "external" barriers and perceptions also matter: Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) find evidence of stereotypical voter expectations that men have more expertise on military matters while women have more expertise on "soft" issues are linked to gender stereotypes about men and women's personality traits. Bauer (2014) extends this work by showing that these stereotypes affect electability, but only when the issue of gender is explicitly activated in the campaign. Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister (2016) show that these stereotypes interact with partisanship: priming terrorist threat causes respondents to evaluate only female Democratic candidates negatively, while Republican candidates of both genders are unaffected by stereotypes. These perceptions also reflect different societal demands on women. Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2018) show that even when there is no outright discrimination or double standards in the assessment of female candidates, the fact that voters prefer candidates with "traditional" profiles (e.g. being married or having children) results in what they term a *double bind* for female candidates.

These findings, and others in the literature, have also led to new experimental interventions to address the gender gap in politics. Prillaman (2018) demonstrates how interventions to facilitate women's credit networks can create positive spillovers to political participation. Karpowitz, Monson and Preece (2017) use a field experiment to explore the determinants of women's candidacy and subsequent electoral success. Their treatment addresses both the "supply" of women candidates and the voter "demand" for women candidates using a three-arm treatment: (i) having party leaders invite women to run for office, (ii) encouraging voters to elect female candidates, (iii) combining both the "supply" and "demand" treatments. They find that both treatments were individually effective, and combining the treatments yielded the largest effects. Closest to our work is a new set of

survey experiments conducted by Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo (N.d.), showing that the presence of women on decision-making panels can serve to legitimize decisions, suggesting that social recognition can cut both ways.

At the same time, voting, joining parties, and running for office are not the only activities that can yield political influence, and they may not necessarily operate in the same ways for women as they do for men. As a result, it is important to identify gender differences in the underlying process of social recognition that can lead to different perceptions of influence for men and women. As outlined in our framework below, we address these underlying differences by focusing not only individual women, but on the broader community and social networks in which they are embedded.

#### 2.1 Gender, Networks, and Political Influence

Our theoretical framework focuses on social recognition and political influence for a number of reasons. First, there is substantial evidence that politics has a social dimension (see, e.g., Sinclair 2012; Abrams, Iversen and Soskice 2011; Bernheim 1994; Rolfe 2012). In their work on social influence, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) found that face-to-face interactions were more influential than messages from the media or elites, and that the individuals were most influenced by peers of similar social status. Similarly, research from surveys in the United States identify discussion networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1991) and social cohesion (Huckfeldt et al., 1995) as important factors for the transmission of political information to citizens.

Second, influence is important for political outcomes not only because of the effect on political attitudes, but also on the ability to mobilize. Previous research linking social pressure to turnout have found that concerns with social image increase turnout (Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008; DellaVigna et al., 2014), and turnout can spread through social networks (Nickerson, 2008). In Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008), participants were more likely to vote if they knew that their neighbors would be told whether they voted. Similarly, Nickerson (2008) shows the social spillover effects of efforts to get out the vote: individuals were not only more likely to vote after receiving a reminder, but members of their household were also more likely to vote even if they did not receive the reminder directly. These effects also apply to campaigning: voter mobilization efforts are more effective when the canvassers are volunteers (Nickerson, 2008) or members of the neighborhood (Sinclair, McConnell and Michelson, 2013) instead of professionals or outsiders.

Third, while most of the work in this area has focused on established democracies, these social dynamics are arguably more important in the less-established democracies in the developing world. For example, 42 percent of survey respondents in the Philippines cite community leaders, personal and social networks as a source of information about local politics (Campos and Hellman, 2005). Social influence may also play a role in clientelistic systems. For example, a candidate can get the votes of many individuals in a community simply by securing the support of a handful of influential leaders who can influence others' political views, elicit compliance and diffuse rewards throughout the network (Banerjee et al., 2013). Recent work focusing on developing democracies also emphasizes the importance of social persuasion and pressure on a number of different modes of political engagement (Ames, Baker and Smith, 2016; Fafchamps, Vaz and Vicente, Forthcoming; Ferrali et al., 2018; Marshall, 0; McClendon, 2014; Schaffer and Baker, 2015).

As a result, our approach builds on the literature on women's engagement by focusing on the social aspect of political influence rather than individual-level activities and achievements. The literature on gender and political engagement tends to focus on factors that are largely within the individual's control: whether she votes, whether she joins a party, whether she attends an assembly or a rally, or whether she stands for office. We argue that in addition to understanding these individual-level factors, it is just as important to understand how those traits and activities are perceived by the broader community. For example, in many contexts, women's involvement in politics may not be seen as socially acceptable, even when there are no formal restrictions on their roles and involvement in politics. Even in political environments where women's involvement is encouraged, women may still face social or cultural barriers: in many cases, women are expected to be more engaged in their communities, with greater social and familial responsibilities.

In other words, it is not only that there are differential barriers to women's participation in politics, but the social perceptions and community assessment of these activities is itself gendered. By contrast, for men, the link between political activities and engagement and recognition from their communities is much more straightforward. Consequently, we develop a framework that focuses not only on women's individual political engagement, but how these traits and activities are perceived by the community.

This approach is particularly suited to addressing the unique challenges for women's political engagement and participation in democracies in the developing world. Even when gender quotas and changing norms emphasize the importance of women's participation in politics, the aggregate numbers show that women are still underrepresented and lag behind men on a number of important metrics when it comes to participation and en-

gagement. We argue that this discrepancy is based on two main disjunctions. First, even if global norms are indicating popular support for women's inclusion in politics in the abstract, this is not translating to a dismantling of social barriers at the community and household level. For example, a 2012 study by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems showed strong support for women's participation in politics among Cambodians: 77 percent strongly supported women serving in Commune Councils, 67 percent strongly supported women heading a political party. However, women are still underrepresented at both the national and commune level and face myriad gender-based socioeconomic barriers to entering politics, including lower literacy rates, an emphasis on the need for women to focus themselves as the moral and economic keystone of their household, common understanding of politics as "a man's world," and so on. Even in advanced democracies, gender stereotypes still hamper the perception of women in both the workplace (see, e.g., Heilman 2012) and the political arena (see, e.g., Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002).

Second, the literature on individual motivations for women to become involved in politics center on the notion of intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation. Are women driven by external factors such as potential compensation, limitations on their time, and institutional or economic constraints? Or are the important factors largely internal, in that women lack political efficacy (used here in the broadest sense—whether women believe they have a say in government and their confidence in their ability to understand and influence political affairs) or interest in politics? One puzzle in the literature is the generally low rate of women's participation in politics across countries, despite variations in institutional constraints as well as the extrinsic and intrinsic factors that we would expect to matter.

Our approach attempts to address these issues by focusing on social factors and social networks. We argue that while intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are undoubtedly important, it is social factors and cultural features that underlie these individual motivations to begin with. In other words, women are indeed weighing the costs and benefits of participating in politics, just that the costs and benefits of these modes of participation are themselves conditioned by gender. In particular, we argue that traditionally "political" activities, such as running for office, attending political assemblies, or joining parties and unions, only translate to political influence for men. Consequently, even when we lower the barriers to entry for women or institute compensation for their time, participation in the same activities simply does not yield the same increases in political influence for women. In other words, it's not so much that women don't strive for political influence and impact, just that the best ways for them to pursue these goals may not be the same

as the ways that men use.

Note that understanding these differential effects of recognition and influence is important even if we are unable to establish the precise cause of the differential perceptions. While we do suggest mechanisms that contribute to these differential effects, even identifying that the social recognition of political achievements is gendered is important for a broad range of interventions for women's political engagement. For example, even if political activities are less likely to lead to recognition and influence for women precisely because there are fewer women in those roles or participating in those activities, the fact that social perceptions are "sticky" means that community recognition is a significant constraint to women's engagement moving forward.

## 3 Gender and Politics in the Philippine Context

The Philippines is an ideal case for exploring differences in political influence at the community level. Like many countries in the developing world, political competition in the Philippines is characterized by strong clientelistic practices organized around social ties and family units (Lande, 1996; Montinola, 1999; Cruz, 2018; Cruz, Labonne and Querubin, 2017). In addition, the relatively low media penetration at the local level means that friends and family are important sources of political information (Campos and Hellman, 2005). Over half (51%) of survey respondents indicate that the opinion of friends and family is one of the top three determinants of their vote choice.

By most measures, the Philippines ranks highly when it comes to women's political participation.<sup>6</sup> It is generally ranked in the top 20 worldwide and top five in Asia for the World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index's measure of political empowerment. Furthermore, it is among the 63 countries which have had a female head of government. Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines ranks first in terms of the number of women in the legislature, with women occupying 27% of the seats in the national assembly (full table available in table A1 in the appendix.

However, these statistics do not necessarily tell the full story, and in fact, can mask more fundamental barriers to women's political involvement in the Philippines. In particular, the primary avenues for women to enter politics are through family ties or celebrity status. For example, the two female presidents of the Philippines, Corazon Aquino and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo both come from political families, the former the widow of a prominent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>For more on women in Philippine politics, please refer to Appendix A.

political leader, and the latter the daughter of a previous President. Moreover, three of the current senators are also part of political dynasties, Nancy Binay (from Makati City), Cynthia Villar (Las Piñas City), and Pia Cayetano (from Taguig City). Labonne, Parsa and Querubin (2017) argued that the increasing number of women occupying elected office is largely driven by political dynasties. They showed that the 1987 Constitutional provision setting a binding term limit of three consecutive times in municipal mayorship positions resulted in the relatives of incumbents being elected. This has implications for policy: female politicians elected as part of dynasties are more likely to continue the policies and platforms set by their male relatives, limiting their political influence and impact.

While this empirical analysis is limited to the Philippines, many characteristics of the social system are also common in other countries in the developing world. For example, strong political dynasties play an important role in other countries such as India, Ireland and Japan amongst others. Even more striking, traditional or cultural limitations on what is considered the socially acceptable sphere of interaction for women are also prominent in many other contexts. One example is Cambodia, where gender stereotyping under *chbab srey*, a traditional code of conduct legitimating gender inequality, can inhibit women's participation in politics.

## 4 Data and Research Design

We implemented a detailed survey in 158 villages in two provinces in the northern part of the Philippines, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur. The surveys were conducted shortly after the May 2016 elections and covered 158 villages in seven municipalities. In each village, the field team obtained the official list of registered voters and randomly selected 22 individuals for inclusion in the survey, for a total sample size of 3,476. Out of these 3,476 respondents, 2109 (61%) are female and 1366 (49%) are male.

### 4.0.1 Measuring Influence

The dependent variable for this study is taken from survey data in which respondents were asked to name individuals whose opinions they respected when it comes to politics. These names were then matched to the names of the respondents within the village

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>See, for example Bohlken (2016) and Smith (2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The English translation of the actual text is as follows: "Please name up to five politicians living in the village, but not living in your household, whose opinions you respect the most when it comes to politics"

to determine the number of individuals reporting them as politically influential. Given that 22 individuals were randomly selected per village, not all influential individuals were included in the survey, but there should be no systematic patterns of inclusion or exclusion that would be expected to affect the results. Out of the sample of 3,476 respondents, 230 were reported as influential by at least one other village member surveyed.

This module was piloted extensively to ensure that we were capturing the concept of influence as social persuasion and local political standing, as opposed to famous national level politicians that respondents may not necessarily know personally, let alone interact with in the course of a campaign. Indeed, respondents were overwhelmingly reporting their local village elected officials as politically influential, accounting for 47% of the responses. These village level officials often serve as brokers for higher level politicians during the elections. Consistent with the notion of social persuasion, the rest are personal connections of the respondent: family members and friends/neighbors are 20% and 29% of responses, respectively.

For each individual named, we collected two additional types of information. First, respondents were asked about their relationship with the individual and were allowed to indicate up to three relationships. For example, if the influential person was both an elected local official and a family member, respondents could indicate both of those relationships. The responses from the survey are used to generate an in-degree measure of political influence, which in simplest terms is a measure of popularity. Individuals with a higher in-degree measure of influence are those who many other respondents have identified as politically influential, while the ones with an influence of zero are those who are not identified as influential by any respondent.

Second, we asked respondents about the individual's traits that contributed to their ability to be politically influential. The traits include: (i) knowing a lot of people in the village, (ii) honesty (moral integrity), (iii) knowledgeable about politics, (iv) approachable (the Filipino term is associated with clientelism and the ability to "approach" the individual for assistance or favors), and (v) politically connected. We use these relationships and traits

and "Other than politicians, please name up to five other individuals living in the village, but not living in your household, whose opinions you respect the most when it comes to politics." Because individuals have a tendency to think of either local or national level politicians when asked about political influence, to make the task cognitively easier, we split the question into two parts. First, respondents are asked to name politicians living in their village whose opinions they respect when it comes to politics. Afterwards, they are asked to name people that they know personally—other than politicians—whose opinions they respect when it comes to politics. Influence measures are calculated based on responses to both parts of the question, but because there are relatively few politicians in the sample, results are substantively similar when excluding politicians.

to test potential mechanisms and develop additional explanations for our main findings.

### 4.0.2 Independent Variables

The main control variables used in this study correspond to the indicators of economic and social status generally identified in the literature on candidacy and political engagement: age, education, distance to the nearest road, and total earnings. Because older, more educated, and wealthier individuals typically participate in politics at higher rates, this analysis accounts for the respondent's age as of his or her last birthday, the highest level of education completed, and the total monthly earnings of the respondent's household. Research on political engagement also point to access as an important variable, which is proxied here using the walking time to the nearest road.<sup>9</sup>

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	3475	0.61	0.49	0	1
Held Office	3475	0.069	0.25	0	1
Spoke at Assembly	3266	0.49	0.50	0	1
Attended Village Assembly	3447	0.95	0.22	0	1
Party Member	3475	0.012	0.11	0	1
Community Association Member	3475	0.11	0.31	0	1
Bayanihan (volunteering)	3277	0.93	0.25	0	1
Attends Religious Services	3475	0.86	0.34	0	1
Social Distance to Mayor	3457	2.55	1.23	1	11
Spouse Held Office	3475	0.039	0.19	0	1
Direct Tie to Mayor	3475	0.18	0.38	0	1
Walking Time to Road	3475	2.47	4.96	0.050	60
Education	3475	9.98	3.53	0	16
Age	3475	45.3	16.3	18	92
Total Earnings	3424	8.68	0.93	6.21	11.9

# 4.1 Model Specification

We estimate linear probability models of the form:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 Female_{ij} + \beta_2 PolExp_{ij} + \beta_3 C_{ij} + \gamma_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Other measures of access used in robustness checks include access to information sources such as t.v., radio, or internet, or the travel time to the nearest city.

where  $Y_{ij}$  refers to the number of people in village j indicating that they respect respondent i's opinion when it comes to politics.  $PolExp_{ij}$  is a vector of political factors that are expected to affect perceptions of political influence for respondent i: (i) having held political office previously, (ii) attending village assemblies, and (iii) party membership.  $C_{ij}$  represents the vector of individual and household-level control variables that are expected to affect political influence, namely age, education, distance to the nearest road, and total earnings (summary statistics for all variables are available in table 1 in the previous section). Municipality fixed effects are represented by  $\gamma_j$  and  $\epsilon_{ij}$  is the error term. Standard errors account for potential correlations within villages (clustered at the village level).

For comparing women and men, we use the following specification interacting gender with the relevant explanatory variables:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_0(Female * PolExp) + \beta_1Female_{ij} + \beta_2PolExpl_{ij} + \beta_4C_{ij} + \gamma_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

As an additional robustness check, appendix B includes regressions splitting the sample between men and women in table B1.

Furthermore, because the dependent variable is a count of people reporting the respondent as influential, robustness checks are conducted using negative binomial regression <sup>10</sup> which yields substantively similar results.

#### 5 Results and Discussion

This section begins by exploring the determinants of political influence more generally, and presenting the results that women are significantly less likely to be considered politically influential. The next part of this section delves more deeply into the differential determinants of influence for men and women. The third part of the section identifies factors that are associated with political influence for women. The section concludes by exploring some mechanisms that could potentially explain the differences.

### 5.1 Comparing Political Influence of Men and Women

First, as table 2 shows, women are significantly less likely to be identified as influential as men, an effect that persists even when controlling for other factors that can be expected

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Negative binomial regression is used instead of poisson regression because of overdispersion.

to affect influence. The factors denoting political experience and engagement in the third column of Table 2 are also significant correlates of political influence: having held office previously, attending village assemblies, and party membership are all positively associated with political influence.

Second, among the controls for socioeconomic status, education and age are both positively associated with political influence. Proximity to the road (indicated by a low walking time to the nearest road) and total earnings are also both positively associated in some models, but the result is not consistent across all specifications.

Table 2: Determinants of Political Influence

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Held Office			1.08***
			(0.18)
Spoke at Assembly			0.11***
			(0.03)
Party Member			2.16**
			(0.79)
Walking Time to Road		-0.0012	-0.00011
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education		0.028***	$0.016^{*}$
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Age		$0.0070^{***}$	0.0045***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Total Earnings		0.075**	0.021
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.33***	-0.92***	-0.41*
	(0.04)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Observations	3475	3424	3221

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

However, the importance of political experience and engagement for perceptions of influence are misleading, in that the effects are largely driven by the positive effects of these factors for the political influence of men. By contrast, these factors are not as important for understanding the political influence of women. As table 3 shows, the strong positive effects of: (i) previously holding office, (ii) membership in a political party, and (iii) attendance at village assemblies are all mediated by gender.

Table 3: Determinants of Political Influence: Comparing Men and Women

		Political	Influence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.072**	-0.022	-0.14***	0.047
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Held Office	1.82***			1.42***
	(0.32)			(0.26)
Female * Held Office	-1.22***			-0.82**
	(0.36)			(0.31)
Spoke at Assembly		0.48***		0.24***
		(0.09)		(0.06)
Female * Spoke at Assembly		-0.42***		-0.21**
		(0.10)		(0.06)
Party Member			3.69**	2.96**
			(1.19)	(1.11)
Female * Party Member			-3.39**	-2.81*
			(1.23)	(1.14)
Walking Time to Road	0.000024	-0.00030	-0.00038	0.00082
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.020**	0.028***	0.027***	0.020**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.0051***	$0.0068^{***}$	0.0062***	0.0047***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total Earnings	$0.038^{+}$	0.071**	$0.051^*$	0.021
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.61**	-1.09***	-0.74***	-0.58**
	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Observations	3424	3221	3424	3221

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

Figure 1 visualizes the marginal effects of gender on the set of variables corresponding to the political determinants of influence, with all control variables held at the means or medians. For these plots, we use the same specifications as the tables, with municipal effects and standard errors clustered at the village level.

<sup>+</sup> p < .10 \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.




Figure 1: Political Engagement and Influence, by Gender

### 5.2 What Makes Women Politically Influential?

If the factors that we commonly associate with political influence do not seem to apply to women, then what types of factors can we use to understand women's political influence? We focus on social factors: embeddedness in the community, social networks, and perceived ability, especially with regard to helping the community. Variables corresponding to community involvement are positively associated with political influence of women.

One such indicator is *bayanihan*, which loosely translates to community volunteering and is strongly engrained in Philippine culture. *Bayanihan* predates the colonial period and began with the tradition of helping families move; in this case, the entire village would literally carry the house (typically on bamboo poles) to its new location. *Bayanihan* is especially useful as a measure of a more generalized or intrinsic service to the community, because activities are chosen collectively, so individual participants contribute without any guarantee that they will directly benefit from future initiatives. Examples of *bayanihan* include community efforts to build an irrigation system, sprucing up buildings, or cleaning up trash around the neighborhood. Other indicators include involvement in

non-political community associations such as community development associations and religious organizations.

For women, the only political factors that matter are those that directly relate to her ability to provide information and services to the community. Political knowledge is positively associated with influence, as are variables that account for the individual's perceived ease of access to either government assistance or government services. Qualitative interviews with community members confirm this: influential women are those that help others in their community understand political issues and navigate the various government and bureaucracies in order to access services and clientelistic goods. While this is related to education and socioeconomic status, it is much more closely linked to practical knowledge about local political issues and processes.

We also show that political dynasties and political families are not a sufficient short cut for women. Consistent with the research on political dynasties, when women's political position draws primarily from the political achievements of relatives, they are not perceived as politically influential. In fact, having a spouse that previously held political office has a *negative* effect on the perception of a woman's political influence. When controlling for whether the woman herself held office, having household members that currently or previous held office are also not associated with political influence, even when these household members were women (i.e. mothers, grandmothers, aunts, or sisters).




Figure 2: Determinants of Political Influence of Women

Notes: Sample is limited to women. Coefficients from regressions with municipality fixed effects and standard errors clustered by village. Main control variables (age, education, distance to the nearest road, and total earnings) included.

#### 5.3 Political Influence and the Social Networks of Men and Women

In addition to establishing that the determinants for political influence differ between men and women, it is equally important to identify potential mechanisms behind the differences. We argue that not only are women's networks fundamentally different from men's networks, but also that women use their networks in different ways. Women have less access to political or business networks, and may instead invest in cultivating social networks: friends, neighbors, church and community organizations. Consequently, membership in networks we would traditionally associate with political influence, such as parties or unions, may be less correlated with political influence for women than for men. We would also expect that family networks operate differently for women, and that unlike men, women cannot circumvent pathways to political influence using the same dynastic stepping-stones that men can take. Even in cultures with bilateral kinship, such as the Philippines, marriage norms often consider women to be a part of their husband's

### family.

There is already evidence that different types of social networks have implications for politics. For example, Szwarcberg (2012) points to the overlap between problem-solving networks—formed by those assisting with issues such as childcare, counseling, or money lending—and political networks to show that broker's ability to influence vote choice is linked to his or her central position in problem-solving networks. Our findings suggest that exploring the different networks of women and men may shed light on the determinants of political influence.

As figure 3 shows, social distance to the mayor matters for the political influence of men, but not women. At the onset, the direct tie to a mayor (a distance of zero) is linked to significantly greater effect on political influence for men than for women. For men, a great social distance corresponds with a decline in political influence. For women, while a direct tie to the mayor is positively associated with political influence (as it is for men), social distance from the mayor generally doesn't play a role in understanding political influence. This suggests that the importance of the direct tie to the mayor may be operating largely through conferring an ability to gain access to government services for the community, and not necessarily implying an importance of political networks in general for women.




Figure 3: Differential Effects of Social Distance for Men and Women

Comparing only the networks of influential men and women also suggest that women's political networks differ from men's political networks. Figure 4 displays the coefficients of various network variables for influential women, expressed as standard deviations above or below the coefficients for influential men. All variables are normalized for comparability and the regressions use the same specifications as the main analysis. Exploring the subset of only influential individuals suggests that influential women are significantly more socially distant from mayors than influential men, and also come from less central families. The social distance variables are taken from a module in the survey on whether the respondent has a direct relationship to the mayor and the number of social ties that connect the respondent to the mayor. <sup>11</sup> 18 percent of survey respondents report having a direct link with the mayor. <sup>41</sup> percent of respondents report an indirect link to the mayor through one intermediary (distance of two) and the remaining 42 percent report an indirect link to the mayor through two or more intermediaries (distance of three or higher). The family centrality variables are calculated using intermarriage ties, following the ap-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>To simplify the task for respondents, the social distance questions are asked in turn. If the respondent does not have a direct tie to the mayor, then the enumerators ask "Do you know someone who knows the mayor personally?" and so on, until the social distance can be established.

proach use by Cruz et al. (2018). Degree centrality refers to the number of intermarriages that the respondent's family has with other families in the village, while eigenvector centrality accounts for whether those intermarriage ties are with families that are similarly well-connected.




Figure 4: Network Characteristics of Influential Women, Compared to Men

Notes: Sample is limited to men and women that were identified as influential by at least one respondent. All variables are normalized for comparability: coefficients are expressed as standard deviations above or below the coefficients for men.

An analysis of the different traits associated with women identified as influential, reported in table 4 below, also support these mechanisms. The survey asked respondents to name the traits they associated with the influential individuals that they identified. Not only did respondents name fewer traits for women in general, but there are patterns in the perception of influential women. Among the influential individuals, women are significantly less likely to be identified as being knowledgeable about politics or politically connected as men. Importantly, it is only the latter result that is robust to factoring in the gender of the nominator: the perception of being less knowledgeable about politics is driven by men, as female nominators are no less likely to identify women as less politically knowledgeable than men. By contrast, nominators of both genders are less likely to identify women as politically connected.

Table 4: Traits of Politically Influential Women

	Popular	Knowledgeable	Approachable	Connected
Female	-0.029	-0.16*	-0.0086	-0.19**
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.07)
Constant	0.99***	0.83***	1.00***	0.63***
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.05)
Observations	213	213	213	213


Notes: Sample is limited to men and women identified as influential by at least one respondent. Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

+ p < .10 \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

# 5.4 Closing the "Political Influence Gender Gap": Is it Enough to Have More Women in Office?

One possibility is that the gender gap in social recognition for political activities is driven largely by the fact that people are less likely to observe women engaging in political activities in the first place. If there are few female role models in politics, then individuals may be less likely to recognize the political influence of women participating in politics. However, as figure 5 shows, the share of female mayors and female council members does not necessarily close the gender gap in perceived influence associated with holding office. In other words, figure 5 shows that the same gender gap evident in figure 1 persists even in communities that have had previous experience with female politicians. In terms of policy implications, this suggests that while it is an important first step, simply having more women in office may not necessarily be enough to narrow the gender gap in perceived political influence associated with political activities.

Figure 5: Differential Effects of Holding Office on Political Influence by Gender and Exposure to Female Politicians



#### 6 Conclusion

The country-level statistics on women's involvement in politics have shown large gains over time. At the same time, this increase in women's involvement in politics has not necessarily resulted in an increase in influence. As Arriola and Johnson (2014) point out, even when women are appointed to cabinet roles, they tend to hold less prestigious portfolios such as education and culture, compared to men appointed to hold high profile portfolios like finance and defense. Even in a country like the Philippines with a tradition of female leaders, women are still more likely to occupy less important or less prestigious positions compared to their male counterparts. Consequently it is important not only to increase the political participation of women, but also to understand the underlying determinants of political influence.

The literature has focused on political, economic, and social status as the determinants of political influence. Together, these dynamics are difficult to assess separately: the wealthy, educated, and socially prominent are often prominent and respected when it

comes to politics as well. We show that these factors are driven largely by the pathways to political influence for men, and that for women, the determinants of influence are much more complex. For women, non-political roles and networks matter more than political parties or dynasties, and their influence draws from their engagement and embeddedness in their communities.

Our framework can also explain the lack of women at higher levels of political office, even when they are very involved in their communities. For men, there is no incongruence between the pursuit of political influence at the local and national levels: the same initiatives and activities that are correlated with political influence at the local level are consistent with pathways to higher political office. By contrast, women who want to achieve political influence in their communities have incentives to invest in community-based social networks instead of formal political or associational life, which then puts them at a disadvantage when it comes to the national level.

In terms of policy applications, this work is important because many policy interventions targeted at women's engagement focus on these traditional modes of political participation. There are campaigns to encourage women to vote, join parties, and run for office. One area for future research is to explore the ways that we can make these initiatives more effective for fostering long-term political influence. Examples can include training and mentoring programs to help women become more effective politicians and gain access to male-dominated political networks. Furthermore, another important implication of this work is for political engagement interventions that are directed to both genders, because when it comes to political influence, it is possible that they disproportionately benefit men at the expense of women. In particular, even when these initiatives focus on political activities that *are* associated with overall increases in political participation among women it may still have unintended effects of widening the political influence gap between men and women.

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# **Supplementary Information**

# **Appendices**

A	Case	A1
В	Alternative Specifications	В1
C	Full Tables for Paper Figures	<b>C</b> 1

#### A Case

The Philippines is ideal for this study because compared to many others in the developing world, it has made considerable progress on women's participation in both the economic and political spheres. If women in this relatively progressive setting are still not receiving equal social recognition for their political activities, then we would expect similar barriers to impede women's influence in other developing countries.

The Philippines in the world's top ten and first in the Asia-Pacific Region in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) since 2006. The country has closed 79% of its gender gap in 2015, scoring high in the education (100%) and health and survival (98%) sub-indexes. The country is also included globally in the top twenty in the economic participation and opportunity sub-index, with a score of 79.9%. The country ranks among the top countries in the world in terms of female political representation and leadership. It is currently ranked 17th worldwide and 3rd in Asia in the GGI's political empowerment sub-index. It is also one of the 63 out of 142 countries, which have had a female head of state or government. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines ranks first in terms of the number of women in the legislature (table A1 below), with women occupying 27.2% of the national assembly.

The Philippines also ranks fifth overall in terms of the number of years with a female head of state, having had sixteen years of female political leadership. In the last thirty years, the country saw two females occupying the highest leadership role in the country, Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010). Even in the previous 2016 presidential campaign, two out of five presidential candidates are women, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Senator Grace Poe.

Table A1: Women's Representation in Legislatures in Southeast Asia

Country	Seats	Women	Percentage
Philippines	289	79	27.3%
Laos	132	33	25%
Vietnam	500	122	24.4%
Singapore	99	24	20.4%
Cambodia	123	25	20.3%
Indonesia	560	104	18.6%
Thailand	500	79	15.8%
Malaysia	222	23	10.4%
Myanmar	431	26	6%

Source: World Bank (2013)

## **B** Alternative Specifications

Table B1 replicates the main results in table 3 in the first column, and presents results splitting the sample between women and men, respectively, in columns 2-3.

Table B1: Determinants of Political Influence: Women vs. Men

	Interaction	Women Only	Men Only
Female	0.047		
	(0.03)		
Female * Held Office	-0.82**		
	(0.31)		
Female * Spoke at Assembly	-0.21**		
	(0.06)		
Female * Party Member	-2.81*		
	(1.14)		
Held Office	1.42***	0.64**	1.41***
	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.26)
Spoke at Assembly	0.24***	$0.049^{+}$	0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Party Member	2.96**	0.14	2.95**
	(1.11)	(0.21)	(1.12)
Walking Time to Road	0.00082	0.0023	-0.00035
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	$0.020^{**}$	$0.013^{+}$	$0.032^{*}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.0047***	0.0039***	$0.0058^{**}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total Earnings	0.021	0.0039	0.046
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.58**	-0.28	-0.95**
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Observations	3221	1980	1241
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

Tables B2-B4 replicates tables 2-4 using negative binomial regression, which is appropriate for regressions in which the dependent variable is a count variable (recall that the measure of influence is a count of people reporting the respondent as influential). Negative binomial regression is used instead of poisson regression because likelihood ratio tests indicate overdispersion.

<sup>+</sup> p < .10  $^{\ast}$  p < 0.05,  $^{\ast\ast}$  p < .01,  $^{\ast\ast\ast}$  p < .001.

Table B2: Determinants of Political Influence

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	-1.14***	-1.13***	-0.79***
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Held Office			1.82***
			(0.23)
Spoke at Assembly			0.73***
			(0.19)
Party Member			0.94**
,			(0.34)
Walking Time to Road		0.0063	-0.000020
O .		(0.02)	(0.01)
Education		0.17***	0.12***
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Age		0.044***	0.035***
O		(0.01)	(0.01)
Total Earnings		0.24*	-0.020
8		(0.12)	(0.11)
Constant	-1.15***	-7.24***	-4.91***
	(0.24)	(0.96)	(0.96)
Constant	2.78***	2.51***	1.97***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Municipal Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3475	3424	3221

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses). + p < .10 \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

Table B3: Determinants of Political Influence: Women vs. Men

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	-0.76***	-0.15	-0.94***	-0.25
	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.27)
Held Office	2.41***			1.67***
	(0.25)			(0.28)
Female * Held Office	-0.45			0.22
	(0.32)			(0.35)
Spoke at Assembly		1.89***		1.21***
		(0.27)		(0.29)
Female * Spoke at Assembly		-1.34***		-0.88*
		(0.34)		(0.35)
Party Member			2.38***	1.10**
			(0.43)	(0.37)
Female * Party Member			-0.96	-1.03 <sup>+</sup>
			(0.74)	(0.58)
Walking Time to Road	0.0037	0.0077	-0.0068	0.0029
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.13***	0.16***	0.16***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	$0.035^{***}$	$0.042^{***}$	0.041***	0.036***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Total Earnings	0.013	0.15	0.18	-0.019
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Constant	-5.08***	-7.50***	-6.61***	-5.37***
	(0.94)	(1.02)	(0.95)	(1.03)
Constant	2.09***	2.30***	2.40***	1.96***
	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Municipal Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3424	3221	3424	3221

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

<sup>+</sup> p < .10 \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

Table B4: Traits of Politically Influential Women

	Popular	Knowledgeable	Approachable	Connected
Female	-0.030	-0.23**	-0.0083	-0.38**
	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.13)
Constant	-0.032	-0.089	-0.019	-0.38*
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.15)
Observations	230	230	230	230

Notes: Sample is limited to men and women that were identified as influential by at least one respondent. Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

<sup>+</sup> p < .10 \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

# C Full Tables for Paper Figures

This section presents the full tables used to create the figures from the main text. Table C1 presents the full tables used to generate the coefficient plots in figure 2. Table C2 presents the results of gender interacted with the social distance to the mayor, presented graphically in figure 3. Table C3 presents the full tables used to generate the coefficient plots in figure 4.

Table C1: Determinants of Political Influence for Women

Attends Religious Services	0.059*							
Volunteering		0.086*** (0.02)						
Community Association Member			$0.12^{+}$ $(0.07)$					
Union Member				0.11**				
Political Knowledge					0.11**			
Access to Govt. Services						0.018*		
Spouse Held Office							-0.10*	
Household Member Held Office							(22.2)	*960.0
								(0.05)
Walking Time to Road	0.0019	0.00041	0.0023	0.0022	0.0018	0.0021	0.0018	0.0025
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	$0.020^{**}$	$0.021^{**}$	$0.020^{**}$	$0.020^{**}$	0.019**	$0.020^{**}$	0.021**	$0.018^{**}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.0048***	0.0051***	$0.0045^{***}$	$0.0044^{***}$	0.0046***	0.0046***	0.0049***	$0.0044^{***}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Total Earnings	0.027	0.028	0.025	0.022	0.026	0.025	0.028	0.023
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	<sub>*</sub> 09.0-	$-0.65^{*}$	-0.52*	-0.51*	$-0.56^{*}$	-0.66*	-0.55*	$-0.51^{+}$
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Observations	2083	1977	2083	2083	2083	2067	2083	2083

Notes: Sample is limited to women. Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).  $+ p < .10^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.$ 

Table C2: Social Distance to Mayor and Political Influence of Men and Women

(1)
-0.42**
(0.15)
-0.088*
(0.04)
$0.082^{+}$
(0.05)
-0.00094
(0.00)
0.027***
(0.01)
0.0069***
(0.00)
$0.074^{**}$
(0.02)
-0.67**
(0.22)
3410

Dependent variable is the number of individuals in the village who reported respecting the respondent's opinion when it comes to politics. Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

<sup>+</sup> p < .10 \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.

Table C3: Comparing Political Networks of Influential Men and Women

	Direct Tie to Mayor	Distance to Mayor	Eigenvector	Degree
Female	-0.066	$0.37^{+}$	-0.12**	-4.83**
	(0.06)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(1.48)
Constant	0.32***	2.33***	$0.40^{***}$	12.5***
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.99)
Observations	272	272	224	224

Notes: Sample is limited to men and women identified as influential by at least one other respondent. Dependent variables indicate political connections and networks: an indicator for a direct tie to the mayor (col. 1); social distance to mayor (col. 2); family centrality measured using eigenvector centrality (col. 3); and family centrality measured using degree centrality (col.4). Municipality fixed effects included and standard errors are clustered by village (in parentheses).

<sup>+</sup> p < .10 \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < .01, \*\*\* p < .001.