I am a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, working in macroeconomics under the supervision of Paul Beaudry. My research studies the identification of macroeconomic shocks, with a focus on high-frequency instruments and on how to combine several imperfect instruments in structural VARs.

In my job market paper, I show that the large impulse responses obtained from high-frequency interest-rate surprises, especially after they are purged of pre-announcement information, need not reflect the strength of transmission. Purging is necessary, since the surprise is predictable, but it can remove more of the instrument’s first stage than of its contamination, enlarging the relative bias of what remains. The constructive response is to widen the instrument window: instruments built from the policy decision itself, rather than from the market’s reaction in a narrow window, better preserve their first stage under the same purge, but carry contamination of their own. I therefore propose a hybrid estimator that pools instruments within blocks sharing a contamination direction
and annihilates across blocks; on U.S. data, it lifts the first stage while preserving block exogeneity and returns a standard monetary contraction.

During my Ph.D., I was a research intern at Banco de México (2026), and before graduate school, I worked as a research assistant at the Bank of Canada (2018–2019). I expect to graduate in spring 2027 and will be available for interviews in the 2026–2027 job market.

Monetary Policy Surprises: A Cautionary Tale (Job Market Paper)

Status: Job market paper. Presented at the Canadian Economics Association (2026), the Student T2M Conference, HEC Montréal (2026), and Banco de México (2026).
Link: https://elatulippe.github.io/files/jmp.pdf
Abstract: Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks identified from high-frequency interest-rate surprises are large: larger than any conventional identification scheme delivers on the same reduced form, and largest of all when the surprise is first orthogonalised on pre-announcement information. Bauer and Swanson (2023) read that enlargement as the removal of an attenuation bias. I argue that it is better read as an artefact of the correction itself: a proxy identifies the response to the mixture of shocks it tracks, and the correction changes that mixture. It is nonetheless necessary, since the surprise is predictable from pre-announcement data, but removing the predictable variation at meeting frequency takes proportionally more of the first stage than of the contamination. The resulting bias can therefore become larger after the correction than before it, on impact and at every subsequent horizon. The constructive response is to widen the instrument window. The shock is what the decision does not owe to economic conditions, and the announcement window reveals only the slice the market had not already priced; instruments built from the decision better preserve their first stage under the same purge. An extended Romer and Romer (2004) narrative shock and a Cholesky-based instrument carry contamination of their own, but retain a stronger first stage. The task is then to pool instruments while accounting for the contamination they have in common. Where no single proxy is both strong and clean, a hybrid estimator replaces a clean anchor with a restriction on the structure of the contamination: pooling within blocks that share a contamination direction buys strength, annihilating across blocks buys validity, and what identifies the direction is the dispersion of relevance within a block. On a panel of U.S. monetary proxies, this helps lift the first stage while preserving block exogeneity and returns a standard monetary contraction.

Purging Monetary Policy Surprises: Necessary but Not Sufficient

Status: Working paper
Link: https://elatulippe.github.io/files/Orthogonalization_Necessary_but_not_Sufficient_Paper.pdf
Abstract: High-frequency monetary policy surprises are predictable from pre-announcement information, and orthogonalizing them on that information has become standard practice. I show that this purge is necessary but not sufficient, through three results. First, what the purge delivers is conditional on the control set. The raw surprise implies that output rises after a tightening; orthogonalization corrects the sign, but the magnitude remains set-identified: the peak output response varies by a factor of two across equally defensible sets of pre-announcement controls. Second, predictability is not spread evenly across announcements. I document a high-frequency footprint of the Fed put: the predictable component is an easing response to financial deterioration, so it concentrates in easing surprises, while tightenings, which typically follow ordinary good-news data, are already close to clean. A symmetric projection fitted largely on the easings therefore overcleans the near-clean tightenings. Third, even the recommended purging order is not innocuous at meeting frequency: the pre-announcement controls are measured over multi-week windows that can overlap the previous announcement, so they have already moved in response to the previous policy shock, and purging can remove genuine monetary variation, weakening the first stage.

Stone PhD Fellowship, Stone Centre, University of British Columbia, 2026–2027
President’s Academic Excellence Initiative PhD Award, UBC, 2021–2025
FRQSC Doctoral Fellowship, 2021–2025
Scarthingmoor MA Prize in Economics, Queen’s University, 2020
Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS–Master’s, Queen’s University, 2019–20

All positions at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C.
Instructor

• ECON 356 – Introduction to International Finance (Undergraduate),Winter 2025 Departmental Tutor
• ECON 602 & ECON 603 – Macroeconomics I & II (Ph.D.), 2024–2026

Teaching Assistant

• ECON 502 – Macroeconomics (Master’s), Fall 2025
• ECON 305 – Honours Intermediate Macroeconomic Analysis I (Undergraduate), Fall 2025
• ECON 356 – Introduction to International Finance (Undergraduate), Fall 2022–Fall 2024