I am a PhD candidate at the Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia. My research is in microeconomic theory, with a focus on mechanism design and information economics. In particular, I study how selling mechanisms perform when buyers form beliefs through misspecified models.

My job market paper, “Selling Mechanisms under Misspecified Learning,” considers a seller whose allocation rule is not observed by buyers, as in many online advertising auctions. Buyers observe only whether they win, and interpret these outcomes through a model that may be misspecified. Because the mechanism generates the outcomes buyers learn from, its design also determines the beliefs they converge to. I characterize the beliefs that can be sustained under learning by some mechanism, and show that the seller can exceed the Myerson benchmark when buyers’ beliefs depend on their valuations, but not otherwise.

Selling Mechanisms under Misspecified Learning (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: Buyers in a repeated selling mechanism hold a misspecified parametric model of their environment and learn by Bayesian updating from allocation outcomes alone. Because the mechanism generates the outcomes buyers learn from, its design shapes what they come to believe. This paper asks when a seller can choose a mechanism under which a given, possibly misspecified, belief is sustained by learning, and characterizes such mechanisms. With a single buyer, conditions on the buyer’s model alone guarantee that a unique mechanism draws every initial belief to the target belief. With two buyers, local stability is established under conditions on the buyers’ models and the value distribution, and a computational method identifies mechanisms that extend the basin of attraction to every belief below the sustained one. The main revenue implication is that value-dependent beliefs can allow the seller to exceed the Myerson benchmark, whereas value-independent beliefs cannot.

Ex-ante Heterogeneity in Directed Search Games (Working Paper)

Abstract: Directed search models usually assume that workers’ skills are drawn from the same distribution. I study a game in which finitely many workers, each knowing his own skill, apply to one of two firms, and each firm hires its most skilled applicant. The standard symmetric equilibrium turns out to be fragile: it is very sensitive to small differences in workers’ skill distributions. I characterize an equilibrium that survives such differences, show that it always exists, and show that it is in a sense the only equilibrium robust to all small asymmetries. The robust equilibrium can be constructed by a recursive algorithm, and I relate it to the symmetric equilibrium used in the literature.

Agustín Beltrán Award for Excellence in Teaching, Vancouver School of Economics, 2024, 2025, 2026
SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship, 2020 – 2024
A. D. Scott Fellowship in Economics, UBC, 2020
Hugh Brock Scholarship, McGill University, 2015 – 2018
J. W. Birch Economics Undergraduate Award, McGill University, 2017
Dean’s Honour List, McGill University, 2015 – 2017

Instructor and Course Designer, UBC Economics Math Camp (MA and PhD sessions), Summer 2026

Designed and delivered the course, including lecture slides, course content and practice problems, under the supervision of Prof. Jesse Perla.

Teaching Assistant, Vancouver School of Economics, UBC, 2019 – 2026

• ECON 600/601 Advanced Microeconomic Theory I/II (PhD core), 2021 – 2026
• ECON 101 Principles of Microeconomics, 2020 and Summer 2025
• ECON 514 Information and Incentives, 2021
• ECON 303 Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis II, 2020
• ECON 355 Introduction to International Trade, 2019