Population aging and human capital investment by youth

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Final Draft,
June 30 2005

Paper submitted to HRSDC as part of the Skills Research Initiative
Summary

This paper examines the link between population aging and the human capital investments of youth. The study proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate an updated version of the Card and Lemieux (2001a) model for Canada using data from the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001 census. The results are used to forecast the impact of population aging on the returns to education of young workers. Second, we review existing empirical studies of the determinants of human capital investments of youth. These studies show that the return to education is one of many important factors in the decision of youth to acquire more education. We show in new empirical work of our own that higher education policies and demographic factors also play a very important role in these decisions. The final step of the paper is to combine the estimates of the updated Card and Lemieux model with existing estimates of the elasticity of human capital investments with respect to cohort size, returns to education, and policy variables that have been obtained. This shows the expected effect of aging on human capital investments of youth under various scenarios.
1. Introduction and Background

Demographic change and human capital investment has long been topic of interest in labour economics. In his seminal work on the “overeducated American”, Freeman (1976) shows that the entry of the large and highly educated baby-boom generation depressed the college wage premium (return to education) during the 1970s. Another seminal study by Welch (1979) shows that the large increase in the number of young workers in the 1970s also had an adverse impact on the level of their wages. More recently, Card and Lemieux (2001a) have developed a general framework in which different age and education groups are modelled as imperfect substitutes for each other. For Canada, the U.S. and the U.K., they find that different age groups are close (elasticity of substitution in the 4-5 range), but not perfect substitutes for each other. Like Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998), Card and Lemieux also find that the elasticity of substitution between high school and university-educated workers is in the 1-2 range.

The results of Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998) have been widely used to help understand how secular changes in the level of education of the workforce affect relative wages in the presence of skilled-biased demand change. These studies also provide a natural framework for forecasting return to education under various assumptions about technological change and human capital investments of future generations of workers. Like Mérette (2002), however, these studies assume that age groups are perfect substitutes for each other, which is inconsistent with the well know results of Welch (1979). By contrast, the Card and Lemieux (2001a)’s model allows for Welch-type cohort effects. This model can thus be used to forecast how upcoming changes in age and education level of the population will
affect the relative wages of all age and education groups. This is crucial for understanding what will be the effect of aging on the education wage premium among young (and older) workers.

Recent research has also shown an important connection between demographic shocks and human capital investments. For instance, Beaudry, Lemieux and Parent (2000), Card and Lemieux (2001b), Fortin (2005) and Bound and Turner (2002) all show that large cohort of youth tend to have a lower level of education than smaller cohorts. This evidence suggests that the level of human capital investment is not solely determined by the demand side (how many youth want to get educated given the prevailing return to education). Supply factors, such as the number of college and university seats available also appears to matter. This is explored in more detail by Fortin (2005) who concludes that, far from being solely determined by demand factors (return to education), human capital investments of youth are strongly affected by public policies (seats available and state/province appropriation, tuition, etc.)

Our study makes three main contributions to the literature. We first update the results of Card and Lemieux (2001a) for Canada using the 2001 census. Card and Lemieux’s study stopped with the 1996 census but, as documented by Boudarbat, Lemieux and Riddell (2003), there has been a significant increase in the returns to education between 1996 and 2001. One interesting hypothesis to test is whether the stagnation in the level of education of young workers in the 1990s (Fortin, 2005) and other related factors could account for these developments. We find strong support for this hypothesis. These new estimates of the Card and Lemieux model are then used to predict the effect of aging on the return to education of young workers. One robust finding is that returns are expected to grow substantially for men, but to remain relatively unchanged for women.
In the second part of the paper, we expand on the above discussion of how demographic and policy factors also affect the human capital investments of youth. Ultimately, the point we make is that even if aging of the population leads to an increase in the return to education, this is unlikely to result in much larger investments of youth in human capital unless the public policies are there to support these investments.

The third and last part of the paper combines the findings of part one and two to conclude how aging is expected to affect the human capital investments of youth, and how policies should be developed or modified to support these investments. To do so, we combine our updated estimates of the Card and Lemieux (2001a) model with some new estimates of the elasticity of human capital investments with respect to cohort size, returns to education, and policy variables.

2. Supply and Demand by Age and Education Groups

2a. Model

The model borrows heavily on Card and Lemieux (2001a). The starting point is that although existing research on the rising return to higher education has emphasized the role of supply variation, most previous studies have focused on the average return to schooling, rather than differences by age or cohort (e.g. Freeman, 1976; Freeman and Needels, 1993; Katz and Murphy, 1992). These studies analyse the evolution of the return to schooling under the assumption that different age groups with the same level of education are perfect substitutes in production. This assumption means that the aggregate supply of each “type” of education can be obtained by simply summing the total numbers of workers in each education category.¹ A

¹In practice, different age groups may be allowed to supply different efficiency units of labour, in which case a weighted average of the supply of workers in each age group is appropriate, with a weight equal to the relative wage of the group (Katz and Murphy, 1992).
further simplification – which we will also invoke – is that there are only two education groups: “university equivalent” workers, and “high school equivalent” workers.\(^2\) Under these assumptions, all education-related wage differentials in the labour market in any given year are proportional to the average university-high school wage gap in that year. Moreover, the university wage premiums for different age groups will expand or contract proportionally over time, a prediction that is clearly inconsistent with recent movements in Canada (see below).

A natural way of relaxing the hypothesis of perfect substitution across age groups is to assume that the aggregate production function depends on two CES sub-aggregates of high-school and university labour:

\[
H_t = \left[ \sum \alpha_j H_j^n \right]^{1/\eta},
\]

and

\[
C_t = \left[ \sum \beta_j C_j^n \right]^{1/\eta},
\]

where \(-\infty < \eta \leq 1\) parametrizes the partial elasticity of substitution \(\sigma_A\) between different age groups \(j\) with the same level of education \((\eta = 1-1/\sigma_A)\), and \(\alpha_j\) and \(\beta_j\) are relative efficiency parameters (assumed to be fixed over time). Note that we use the variable “C” to refer to university labour, following the tradition in the literature (since university is called college in the United States). In principle \(\eta\) could be different for the two education groups, although we ignore this possibility to simplify the model.\(^3\) In the limiting case of perfect substitutability

\(^2\)Following the literature (e.g. Johnson, 1997) we assume that workers with exactly a high school degree supply 1 high school equivalent; workers with exactly an undergraduate university degree supply 1 college equivalent; workers with less than high school education supply some fraction of a high school equivalent; workers with an advanced degree supply more than 1 college equivalent; and workers with education qualifications between a high school and college degree supply \(\alpha\) high school equivalents and \((1-\alpha)\) college equivalents. More details are provided in the data appendix.

\(^3\)Welch (1979) relaxes this assumption in his study on the impact of cohort size on the relative wages of different age groups. Card and Lemieux (2001a) present evidence, however, that \(\eta\) is relatively similar for high school and university workers.
across age groups, $\eta$ is equal to 1 and total high-school (or university) labour input is just a weighted sum of the quantity of labour supplied by each age group.

Aggregate output in period $t$, $y_t$, is a function of high school labour, university labour, and the technological efficiency parameters $\theta_{ht}$ and $\theta_{ct}$:

$$y_t = f(H_t, C_t; \theta_{ht}, \theta_{ct}).$$

Following the existing literature, we assume that the aggregate production function is also CES:

$$y_t = \left( \theta_{ht} H_t^\rho + \theta_{ct} C_t^\rho \right)^{1/\rho},$$

where $-\infty < \rho \leq 1$ parameterizes the elasticity of substitution $\sigma_E$ between the two education groups ($\rho = 1 - 1/\sigma_E$). In this setting, the marginal product of labour for a given age-education group depends on both the group's own supply of labour and on the aggregate supply of labour in its education category. In particular, the marginal product of high school workers in age group $j$ is:

$$\frac{\partial y_t}{\partial H_{jt}} = \frac{\partial y_t}{\partial H_t} \times \frac{\partial H_t}{\partial H_{jt}} = \theta_{ht} H_t^{\rho-1} \Psi_t \times \alpha_j H_{jt}^{\eta-1} H_t^{1-\eta} = \theta_{ht} H_t^{\rho-\eta} \Psi_t \times \alpha_j H_{jt}^{\eta-1}$$

where

$$\Psi_t = \left( \theta_{ht} H_t^\rho + \theta_{ct} C_t^\rho \right)^{1/\rho-1}.$$

Similarly, the marginal product of university workers in age group $j$ is:

$$\frac{\partial y_t}{\partial C_{jt}} = \theta_{ct} C_t^{\rho-\eta} \Psi_t \times \beta_j C_{jt}^{\eta-1}.$$

Efficient utilization of different skill groups requires that relative wages are equated to relative marginal products. Assuming this is true, equations (5) and (6) imply that the ratio of the wage rate of university workers in age group $j$ ($w_{ct}^j$) to the wage of high-school workers in the same age group ($w_{ht}^j$) satisfies the following equation:
(7) \[ \log \left( \frac{w^c_{jt}}{w^h_{jt}} \right) = \log(\theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht}) + (\rho-\eta)\log(C_t/H_t) + \log(\beta_j/\alpha_j) + (\eta-1)\log(C_{jt}/H_{jt}). \]

If relative employment ratios are taken as exogenous, equation (7) leads to a simple model for the observed university-high school wage gap of workers in age group j in year t:

(8a) \[ r_{jt} = \log(\theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht}) + \log(\beta_j/\alpha_j) + [(1/\sigma_A)-(1/\sigma_E)]\log(C_t/H_t) - (1/\sigma_A)\log(C_{jt}/H_{jt}) + e_{jt}, \]

where \( e_{jt} \) reflects sampling variation in the measured gap and/or any other sources of variation in age-specific wage premiums. For some purposes it is convenient to re-arrange this expression in an alternative form:

(8b) \[ r_{jt} = \log(\theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht}) + \log(\beta_j/\alpha_j) - (1/\sigma_E)\log(C_t/H_t) - (1/\sigma_A)[\log(C_{jt}/H_{jt})-\log(C_t/H_t)] + e_{jt}, \]

According to this model, the university-high school gap for a given age group depends on both the aggregate relative supply of university labour (\( C_t/H_t \)) in period t, and on the age-group specific relative supply of university labour (\( C_{jt}/H_{jt} \)). The model nests the more conventional specification (used by Freeman (1976), Katz and Murphy (1992), and others) which assumes perfect substitution across age groups with the same level of education (\( \sigma_A = +\infty \)). Since \( 1/\sigma_A = 0 \) when age groups are perfect substitutes, in the limiting case the university-high school wage gap for any specific age group depends only with the aggregate relative supply of university workers and the relative technology shock \( \theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht} \). More generally, the university-high school wage gap for a given age group also depends on the age group-specific relative supply of university labour. Changes over time in the relative supply of highly educated workers in different age groups would be expected to shift the age profile of the university-high school wage gap, with an effect that varies with the magnitude of \( 1/\sigma_A \).

A closely related observation is that when \( \log(C_{jt}/H_{jt})-\log(C_t/H_t) \) varies over time, observed data on age-group specific relative returns to education will contain significant cohort
**effects**, in addition to components that vary by age and year. This is because the relative supply of highly-educated labour in a cohort is roughly constant over time, apart from age effects that reflect rising educational attainment over the lifecycle. Formally, suppose that the log supply ratio for workers who are age $j$ in year $t$ consists of a cohort effect for the group, $\lambda_{t-j}$ (dated by their year of birth), and an age effect $\phi_j$ that is common across cohorts:

$$\log \left( \frac{C_{jt}}{H_{jt}} \right) = \lambda_{t-j} + \phi_j .$$

In this case equation (8a) implies

$$r_{jt} = \log(\theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht}) + \log(\beta_j/\alpha_j) - (1/\sigma_A) \phi_j + [(1/\sigma_A) - (1/\sigma_E)] \log(C/H) - (1/\sigma_A) \lambda_{t-j} + e_{jt} .$$

According to this equation, the observed university-high school wage gaps for a set of age groups $j=1,..J$ in a sample period $t=1,..T$ will depend on a set of year-specific factors that are common across age groups ($\log(\theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht}) + [(1/\sigma_A) - (1/\sigma_E)] \log(C/H)$), a set of age-group specific factors that are common across years ($\log(\beta_j/\alpha_j) - (1/\sigma_A) \phi_j$), and a set of cohort-specific factors ($1/\sigma_A) \lambda_{t-j}$). This implies that the observed university wage premiums will be decomposable into year, age, and cohort effects. The cohort effects will be ignorable if $1/\sigma_A$ is approximately 0 (i.e. if different age groups are perfect substitutes in production) or if $\lambda_{t-j}$ is a linear function of birth year (in which case the cohort effects can be written as a linear combination of age and year effects).4

2b. **Implementation**

At first glance, it is not clear how to estimate this model. On the one hand, it is possible to estimate the effect of age-group specific relative supplies of highly educated labour on age-group specific returns to university. On the other hand, assuming that data on age group-specific wages

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4The latter condition will also imply that $\log(C_j/H_j) - \log(C/H)$ is approximately constant over time.
and supplies of labour for university and high school equivalent workers are available, a problem still arises in attempting to estimate equation (8a) or (8b) because the aggregate supplies of the two types of labour \((C_t \text{ and } H_t)\) depend on the elasticity of substitution across age groups.

Inspection of equation (8a), however, suggests a simple two-step estimation procedure that provides a method for identifying both \(\sigma_A\) and \(\sigma_E\). In the first step, \(\sigma_A\) is estimated from a regression of age-group specific university wage gaps on age-group specific relative supplies of university educated labour, age effects (which absorb the relative productivity effect \(\log(\beta_j/\alpha_j)\)), and time effects (which absorb the combined relative technology shock and any effect of aggregate relative supply):

\[
(11) \quad r_{jt} = b_j + d_t - (1/\sigma_A)\log(C_{jt}/H_{jt}) + e_{jt},
\]

where \(b_j\) and \(d_t\) are the age and year effects, respectively. Given an estimate of \(1/\sigma_A\), the relative efficiency parameters \(\alpha_j\) and \(\beta_j\) are easily computed by noting that equations (5) and (6), together with the assumption of equality between wages and marginal products, imply:

\[
(12a) \quad \log(w^h_{jt}) - (\eta-1)H_{jt} = \log(\theta_h H_t^{\rho-\eta} \Psi_t) + \log(\alpha_j) \quad (\text{for all } j \text{ and } t),
\]

and

\[
(12b) \quad \log(w^c_{jt}) - (\eta-1)C_{jt} = \log(\theta_c C_t^{\rho-\eta} \Psi_t) + \log(\beta_j) \quad (\text{for all } j \text{ and } t).
\]

The left-hand sides of these equations can be computed directly using the first-step estimate of \(1/\sigma_A\) (-1/\(\sigma_A = \eta-1\)), while the leading terms on the right hand sides can be absorbed by a set of year dummies. Thus, the age-group specific productivity factors (\(\log(\alpha_j)\) and \(\log(\beta_j)\)) can be estimated as age effects in regression models based on equations (11) and (12) that also include unrestricted year dummies. Given estimates of the \(\alpha_j\)'s and \(\beta_j\)'s, and of \(\eta\), it is then straightforward to construct estimates of the aggregate supplies of university and high school labour in each year \((C_t \text{ and } H_t)\). With these estimates in hand, and some assumption about the
time series path of the relative productivity term $\log(\theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht})$, equation (8b) can be estimated directly. In our implementation below we follow the existing literature and assume that $\log(\theta_{ct}/\theta_{ht})$ can be represented as a linear trend.

The second step of our procedure is directly analogous to the estimation method used by Freeman (1976) and Katz and Murphy (1992) to recover the elasticity of substitution between education groups. The key difference is that our estimates of the aggregate supplies of different education groups incorporate a non-zero estimate of $1/\sigma_A$. A less important difference is that we estimate our models over a set of age-group specific university wage premiums, rather than over a set of aggregate premiums for all age groups. Finally, our second stage models include both the aggregate relative supply index ($\log(C_t/H_t)$) and the deviation between the age-group specific relative supply of university workers and the aggregate supply index (i.e. $\log(C_{jt}/H_{jt})-\log(C_t/H_t)$). The coefficient associated with this variable provides another estimate of $1/\sigma_A$ which in principle should be similar to the estimate obtained from the first stage.

2c. Results: Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows the university-high school wage gaps by age groups for 1980 to 2000 based on the Canadian Census of 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001. As explained in Boudarbat, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003), the Census is by far the best data source available to estimate our model because of large sample sizes and consistent questions (over time) about education and earnings. More detailed on the data are provided in the Data Appendix. The numbers for 1980 to 1995 for men reproduce those from the Card and Lemieux (2001a) study while those for 2000 have been updated using the recently released 2001 Canadian Census. The numbers for women are also
computed using the 1981 to 2001 Census. The university-high school wage gaps are also shown in Figure 1a (men) and 1b (women).

There are a number of interesting features in Table 1 and Figure 1. First, consistent with Boudarbat, Lemieux and Riddell (2003), the university-high school wage gap increased substantially between 1995 and 2000 for all groups of men except those age 56 to 60. As documented by Card and Lemieux (2001a), between 1980 and 1995 returns increase for younger workers, decreased for older workers, and remained relatively constant for “middle age men” (those age 36 to 50). Card and Lemieux’s explanation for this “tilting” in the age profile of the return to university was based on differences in the relative supply of university education for different age groups. In particular, returns for younger cohorts increased between 1980 and 1995 because of the stagnation in the educational attainment of the largest cohorts of the baby boom (those born between the early 1950s and the mid-1960s). This phenomenon can readily be seen in Table 2 that shows the fraction of men and women with a university undergraduate degree (BA, etc.) or more. For instance, the fraction of men age 31-35 with a university degree remained unchanged between 1980 (0.190) and 1995 (0.188). By contrast, the fraction of men age 51-55 with a university degree more than doubled from 0.093 in 1980 to 0.197 in 1995. Relatively speaking, there was thus a much larger increase in the relative supply of education for older than younger men. As predicted by the above model where age groups are imperfect substitutes for each other, this lead to a relative decline in the university-high school wage gap for older workers, and to a relative increase in the in the university-high school wage gap for younger workers. By contrast, the university-high school wage gap increased more uniformly across age groups between 1995 and 2000. As we will show later, this is consistent with a
slowdown in the rate of growth of aggregate, as opposed to age-group specific, relative supply of university education.

A second important feature of Table 1 and Figure 1 is that the university-high school wage premium is substantially larger for women than men. For instance, the premium ranges from 0.336 to 0.467 for women but from 0.224 to 0.356 for men in 2000. Furthermore, the premium has generally been declining for women over time, except for the youngest (age 26-30) age group. Table 2 suggests a possible explanation for this difference between men and women. As is well known, the level of education of women has increased faster than the level of education of men. As a result, the faster growth in relative supply of education for women is expected to reduce the university wage premium for women relative to men. More specifically, Table 2 shows that in 1980, the fraction of women with a university degree was lower than the corresponding fraction of men for each and every age group. By 2000, however, women up to age 45 are now more educated than men. The difference is particularly striking for the 26-30 age group. Over 30 percent of women age 26-30 now have a university degree, compared to only 23 percent for men.

Figure 2 illustrates the differential evolution in the relative supply of men and women in a way more directly linked to the model estimates reported below. Remember that we compute the relative supply by computing “university” and “high-school” equivalent labour for each age group. To show how these relative supplies change over time, we estimate the regression model shown in equation (9) where age-group relative supplies \( \log(C_{jt}/H_{jt}) \) are regressed on a set of birth cohort and age group dummies. The age dummies capture the fact that education changes over time for the same cohort for a variety of reasons. First, people may actually be upgrading their education (especially for people in their twenties). Second, immigration and emigration
may change the education level of a cohort over time (we look at all workers, not only natives). Third, since we look at the relative supply of workers, changes in the relative employment rates of high school and university workers may also affect the mix of workers over the life-cycle. Finally, differential mortality by education may also affect the relative supplies at older ages. It is easy to see in Table 2 that, overall, relative education tend to increase for a given cohort over time. For instance, 0.167 of men age 26-30 had a university degree in 1980. Moving along the diagonal, the fraction of this cohort with a university degree increase to 0.182 in 1985, 0.195 in 1990, 0.203 in 1995 and 0.215 in 2000. This shows that it is important to adjust for age when comparing the level of education of different cohorts.

Figure 2a reports the age-adjusted estimates of the relative supply by birth cohort. We use age 41-45 as the base case in the regressions (dummies are included for all other age groups), which means that Figure 2a shows the predicted log relative supply of each cohort when they are in their early forties. (Figure 2b translates the log relative supplies into a more easily interpretable fraction of university labour C_jt/(H_jt+C_jt) ). A number of striking features emerge from the figure. As discussed earlier, the level of education of women used to the lower than men’s. Figure 2a shows that the male-female gap in education increased between the 1916-20 and the 1921-25 and 1926-30 birth cohort, a change that is consistent with the “Canadian GI Bill” boosting up the level of education of younger WWII veterans (Lemieux and Card, 2001). But women eventually caught up and surpassed the education of men starting with the 1956-60 birth cohort.

Another striking feature is the prolonged stagnation in the level of educational achievement of the largest cohorts of the baby boom. Indeed, the level of education (or relative supply of university education) of the three largest birth cohorts (1951-55, 1956-60, 1961-65) is
no larger than for the 1946-50 cohort.\textsuperscript{5} This prolonged stagnation for men has also been documented for the United States by Card and Lemieux (2001a). This is the driving force behind the “tilting” in the age profile of the university premium discussed earlier. Note also that the rate of growth of the relative supply for women slowed down substantially during the same period.

Finally, Figure 2a indicates that the relative supply appears to be stagnating again for the 1976-80 cohort, which is the youngest one used in the analysis (age 21-25 in 2001). We discuss in much more detail in Section 3 the factors explaining these interesting inter-cohort trends in relative supply. We also provide more formal evidence below that differences in relative supply growth for men and women can account for differential male-female trends in the university wage premium.

\textit{2d. Results: Estimates of the Model}

Table 3 reports estimates of the supply and demand model with imperfect substitution between age groups outlined in Section 2a. Columns 1 to 3 reproduce the results of Card and Lemieux (2001a) for the 1980-95 period. All models include a set of unrestricted age dummies for the seven age groups shown in Tables 1 and 2, but the estimated age effects are not reported in the tables. Column 1 shows estimates when the age-group relative supply \(\log(C_{jt}/H_{jt})\) is included as a regressor along with a set of year dummies. The coefficient is precisely estimated at -0.165, suggesting a relatively large elasticity of substitution across age groups \(\sigma_A = 1/0.165 \approx 6\). Column 2 reports the estimates in which the year dummies are replaced by the standard Katz and

\textsuperscript{5} As we show later show in Figure 4, cohorts born in 1951-55, 1956-60 and 1961-65 are substantially larger than the cohort born in 1946-50, despite the fact that the latter is typically more closely identified with the “baby boom generation”. We use the wider definition of the baby boom that goes until 1964 for the purpose of this paper.
Murphy aggregate supply index. As discussed earlier, the Katz and Murphy index is based on the assumption that age groups are perfect substitutes (elasticity of substitution $\sigma_A$ is infinite) for each other, which is rejected in the data ($\sigma_A \approx 6$ which is large but not infinite). The results are nonetheless reported for the sake of comparability with most of the literature. A linear trend is also included to capture steady changes in the relative demand for university-educated workers. Column 3 then shows what happens when the Katz and Murphy index is replaced by the more appropriate index of aggregate supply that accounts for imperfect substitutability between age groups. As discussed in Section 2b, this index is computed using a two-step procedure. Further estimation details are not discussed here since this is all explained in detail in Card and Lemieux (2001a).

Unfortunately, both the trend and the effects of aggregate supply are imprecisely estimated in column 2 and 3 (these are estimates of the model shown in equation (8b)). As a result, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of both variables is zero. Figure 3 shows that these results reflect the strong collinearity between aggregate supply and a linear trend. The figure shows that, for men, the index of aggregate supply that accounts for imperfect substitutability between age groups essentially grows linearly over time between 1980 and 1995. As a result, it is not possible to separately identify the effect of aggregate supply from the effect of a linear trend over this period.

Figure 3 also suggests, however, that 2000 represent a marked departure relative to earlier trends. While the aggregate supply of university labour grew by 0.144, on average, for each five-year interval between 1980 and 1995, it only increased by half as much (0.073) between 1995 and 2000. This results in a clear trend break that is clearly seen in Figure 3. This marked slowdown in the growth in aggregate supply for men is due to a combination of factors.
First, the level of education of the newest cohort to enter the labour market (1976-80 birth cohort) is no larger than for the preceding cohort (1971-75). Second, the prolonged stagnation in the relative supply of the largest baby boom cohorts means that middle age workers in 2000 are not much more educated than older workers (born in the 1940s). As a result, older workers who exit the labour market are no longer replaced by much more educated workers, as used to be the case in the 1980s and early 1990s.

As noted earlier, the university premium increased significantly for men between 1995 and 2000. This is also shown in Figure 3 that shows the evolution of the average premium (over all age groups) between 1980 and 2000. Just like the change in supply between 1995 and 2000 represents a break relative to earlier trends, the marked increase in the return to university also represents a break relative to earlier trends. The relative evolution of the two series suggests that the decline in the growth in relative supply between 1995 and 2000 may be linked to the growth in the return to university during the same period.

Column 6 of Table 3 confirms this conjecture. When the 2000 data is added to the model, we are now able to separately identify the effect of the linear trend from the effect of aggregate supply. The results indicates that the trend accounts for a 1.5 percent annual growth in the return to university, while the effect of aggregate supply is estimated to -0.479, which implies an elasticity of substitution between university and high school labour of about 2 ($\sigma_E = 1/0.479 \approx 2$). Both estimated effects are significantly different from zero. Note also that the estimated effect of age-group specific supply remains relatively unchanged when the 2000 data is included in the analysis. Note finally that using the Katz-Murphy aggregate supply index yields qualitatively similar, but not statistically significant estimates (column 5). Since the aggregate
supply index based on imperfect substitution across age groups is more appropriate (given that $\sigma_A \approx 6$) we focus on these model estimates for the rest of the paper.

Adding the 2000 data thus has a remarkable impact on the estimates. Table 4 shows that the estimates that include the 2000 data are now surprisingly similar to those for the United States of United Kingdom reported in column 1 and 2 of the table (these estimates are from Card and Lemieux (2001a)). This gives us quite a bit of confidence about the validity of these estimates. The fact that the estimates are robust over three different countries for different time periods (the U.S. samples go back the late 1950s) suggest that it may be sensible to use the models estimates to try to forecast was is likely to happen in the next twenty years in Canada. We explore this issue in detail in Section 4.

Finally, the last column of Table 4 shows what happens when the main model is fit to the university-high school wage gaps for both men and women. The only extra variable included in the model is a dummy variable for women that captures the fact that the return to university is generally larger for women than men. The estimated effect of the trend and aggregate supply (computed for women using the same procedure as for men) are very similar to the estimates for men only. Note, however, that the effect of both the trend and aggregate supply are much more precisely estimated than in the models for men only. The reason why the model works so well can again be seen in Figure 3. The figure shows that aggregate supply increases faster for women than men, while the opposite is true for the return to university. So the male-female trend differences in relative supply and return to university are also consistent with a simple supply and demand story. This suggests that returns to university have increased less for men than women because female supply increased more. The fact that the standard errors are smaller when women are also included in the regression models suggests that male-female trend
differences are a powerful source of additional identification for the model. The similarly in the estimated effect of aggregate supply in the last two columns of Table 4 also suggest that the same supply and demand model with imperfect substitution across age groups can explain both the growth in return to university for men between 1995 and 2000, and the steady decline in the return to university for women throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

3. Existing Evidence on the Determinants of Post-Secondary Enrollment Rates

A higher education economic framework is appropriately set at the jurisdictional level, where policymakers determine the level of higher education funding, as well as tuition and capacity levels at public colleges and universities. The observed enrollment rates can then be seen as outcomes of a supply and demand model, where prospective students demand university/college seats and where public institutions supply those seats with tuition fees serving as the intermediating price. Enrollment supply is positively related to tuition fees, which have the potential to increase the revenues of higher education institutions. Enrollment demand is negatively related to tuition fees, which increase the cost of attending university or college. However, as pointed by Clotfelter (1999), a singular feature of the higher education market is the presence of non-price rationing: excess demand for college seats is a necessary condition for selectivity in admissions. In turn, selectivity in admissions is the mechanism used by institutions to set a lower bound on the quality of applicants. Institutions can thus in theory use a combination of these two instruments—price and grades—to equilibrate supply and demand.

In practice, different countries have favoured more or less rigid institutional framework. In France, admission in the elite “Grandes Écoles" is restricted to very high aptitude students on the basis of an admission test that often requires attendance in preparatory schools, but tuition is
very low (380€). There is virtually universal and free access (on average 200€ at La Sorbonne) to universities thought to be of lower quality. The United States enjoys a mixed system of private and public institutions. Admission to the American elite private institutions is restricted by very high tuition (20,015$US in 2003-04) and/or very high grades. Public institutions use a combination of price and grades with public research universities requiring moderate tuition (4,793$US in 2003-04) and restricting access on the basis of aptitude, while public community and technical colleges have very low tuition (2,142$US) and unrestricted admission.

As often thought, the Canadian higher education system can be placed at some intermediate point between the French and American systems: it attempts to emphasize wider access while being somewhat preoccupied with quality. Skolnik and Jones (1992) argue that Canadian universities are not hierarchically differentiated. Yet, while they are no elite private institutions in Canada, the three best public research universities (University of Toronto, UBC and McGill) rank 18th, 28th and 50th in North-America, respectively. Like in the United States, Canadian public institutions have less latitude in setting tuition fees than private institutions.

Until the mid-1990s tuition was set at the provincial level with institutions having very few

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6 In the academic ranking of world universities (url: ed.sjtu.edu.cn/ranking.htm), the highest ranking French university, Université Paris VI is ranked 65th, while the top ranking Canadian university, the University of Toronto, is ranked 23rd.

7 At some elite universities/4-year colleges, as much as 40 percent of students are admitted on a needs-blind basis with an average of 18,000$US in scholarships. Yet because of its high cost, needs-blind admission for high aptitude students at elite universities has been curtailed following the 1991 law suit (Salop and White (1991)).


9 The few Canadian private institutions (such as Alberta’s King’s College) are religiously-based, not-for-profit, and focused on undergraduate education. These rankings (url: ed.sjtu.edu.cn/ranking.htm) emphasize health and science.
options to ask for differential tuition. In the mid-1990s, however institutions in Ontario began asking close to market price for professional programs.

    In theory, institutions can compete for the best students by using combinations of price and grades—or price discrimination—almost on a per student basis with “merit” based scholarships. In Canada, institutional outlays to student support went from 7.5 percent in 1980 to 10.4 in 1999. Meanwhile in the United States, public institutional outlays to student scholarships and fellowships increased from 3 percent to 6 percent. Yet much of the competition among institutions may take other forms, including the influential Canadian MacLeans’s and U.S. News and World Report rankings of universities and colleges (Mueller and Rockerbie (2002), Monks and Ehrenberg (1999)).

    Governments on the other hand are concerned with equality of opportunity objectives. In the 1970s in particular, many jurisdictions kept hikes in tuition fees well below the inflation rate. At times, they have even frozen nominal tuition fees. Governments also offer means-tested scholarships and loans making the net cost of attending universities less than posted tuition for many students. While Clotfelter (1999) finds some evidence of increasing inequality in the link between socio-economic status and college attendance, this troublesome trend is sharpest among private universities. In Canada, Corak et al. (2003) find no evidence of an increase in the link between parental income and participation in post-secondary education. But Coelli (2004) finds substantial negative effects of changes in parental income associated with unemployment shocks. Recent research (Kane (2003)) has also focused on financial aid as way to alleviate the potential inequality increasing effect of rising tuition.

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10Corak et al. (2003) report specific differences by institutions and fields of study in differential tuition increases.

In economics, the post-secondary enrollment decisions of high school graduates are seen as solutions to a simplified version of the human capital investment model. After completing high school, individuals are faced with the decision of whether or not to get a university degree by maximizing the discounted present value of lifetime earnings, net of education costs.\(^\text{12}\)

Assuming that the marginal cost of attending university rises faster than the marginal benefit, the discounted lifetime earnings function is concave and the solution to this maximization problem equates the marginal costs of a university education to the marginal benefits. Individual heterogeneity in the decision to attend university or not will arise from differences in the marginal benefits of obtaining a university degree or differences in the marginal costs obtaining a university degree. Aggregating across individuals in any given jurisdiction will imply that jurisdictional differences in educational attainment will arise from differences in the returns to a university/college education and in the marginal costs of that education. Thus enrollment rates should be higher in jurisdiction with higher returns to a university degree and lower net costs of attendance, and conversely.

Yet precise information about the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of a university education may not be precisely known or correctly estimated by prospective students. In evaluating the marginal benefits, do prospective students use the national university/college premium or rather the provinces/state specific values? Do they use a contemporaneous, past, or discounted expected present value of that premium? In evaluating the marginal costs, prospective students may not be fully aware of the parameters of the financial assistance available to them and may make irrational decisions (Avery and Hoxby (2004)). Because of these informational

\(^{12}\text{This formulation is appropriate if people can borrow and lend at a fixed interest rate, and if they are indifferent between attending school and working. More generally, differences in aptitudes and tastes for schooling relative to work may lead to differences in the optimal level of schooling across individuals.}\)
difficulties, it is reasonable to believe that the very concrete level of tuition fees may have an
unduly important effect on those decisions (Kane, 1999). In effect, Fortin (2005) finds that in
the United States the negative impact of tuition on enrollment rates is more significant than the
positive impact of within-state college premia.

On the enrollment supply side, the ability of public institutions of higher education to
supply university/college seats greatly depends on the level of provincial funding, which
constitute their most important single revenue source. There are many quasi-fixed costs
associated with the expansion of college seats. At the extensive margin, increasing the number of
college seats by increasing the number of institutions entails expansions in physical buildings
which are not easily scaled down.13 Card and Lemieux (2001b) argue that the partial adjustment
of the higher education system to the temporary bulge in enrollment caused by the baby boom
may have been a rational response. At the intensive margin, increasing the number of seats at
existing institutions may imply the hiring of tenured or tenured-track faculty whose numbers are
also not easily brought down. Bound and Turner (2002) argue that institutions face a quality-
quantity tradeoff in expanding the number of college seats. When financial resources do not fully
adjust to changes in the college-age population, limiting the expansion of college seats preserves
institutional quality. Either argument has become known as the “cohort crowding” hypothesis,
which implies a negative impact of cohort size on enrollment rates. However, the 1980s onwards
were characterized by the baby bust cohort becoming of college-age, thus one should expect
enrollment rates going up as a “cohort hollowing” effect.

13The option of leasing regular office space is one that maintains higher flexibility, yet some
physical demands (labs, amphitheater, etc.) of instruction rarely make this choice a long term
one.
Given the above considerations, it is reasonable to think that tuition levels seldom play the equilibrating role that prices ought to play in supply and demand system. Thus the higher education system is often in a state of dis-equilibrium, where the enrollment rate is determined by the short side of the market. If tuition is too low, the short side of the market will be the supply side and the provincial funding will determine the enrollment rates. If tuition is too high, the short side of the market will be the demand side and the tuition levels will determine the enrollment rates. Another complication arises from the fact that at times, tuition levels are exogenously determined by policy makers, when tuition levels are frozen in nominal terms for example (as in Quebec in the early 1980s). At other times, tuition levels and provincial funding are negatively correlated. It is thus also possible for tuitions to be high while low provincial funding determines enrollment rates. A reduced form equation of enrollment rates observed at the jurisdictional level and thus focuses on higher education policies will be of the form\(^{14}\)

\[
E_{jt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Tui_{jt} + \beta_2 r_{jt} + \beta_3 App_{jt} + \beta_4 Col_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt}
\]

where \(E_{jt}\) represents the logarithm of the ratio of FTE Fall enrollments in public universities and 4-year colleges divided the number of persons aged 18 to 24 in jurisdiction \(j\) at time \(t\), \(Tui_{jt}\) represents the logarithm of average tuition, \(r_{jt}\) represents the college premium, \(App_{jt}\) represents the logarithm of per-college-age person provincial/state appropriations, \(Col_{jt}\) the logarithm of the number of persons aged 18 to 24. The jurisdiction-time specific errors are further modeled as \(\varepsilon_{jt} = \beta_J J_j + \beta_P P_t + \xi_{jt}\), where \(J_j\) are jurisdiction-specific dummies, and \(P_t\) time period dummies.

\(^{14}\)There are substantial difficulties in estimating formal dis-equilibrium models with controlled prices, such as establishing which regime prevails in each jurisdiction at each time period. The approach here is closer in spirit to the one suggested by Hendry and Spanos (1980) which concentrates on market pressures.
Other authors (Quigley and Rubin (1993), Berger and Kostal (2002) among others) have attempted to estimate separate more structural models of enrollment demand and enrollment supply. The difficulties there are of finding appropriate instruments to identify either curve. Quigley and Rubin (1993) for example acknowledge that the negative sign on tuition in their legislative supply equation may be the result of an identification problem.

Fortin (2005) estimates a model closely related to equation (13), where the college premium is omitted, but will be further incorporated in the next version of the present paper. The results are reported in table 4, where the logarithm of the jurisdiction specific ratio of FTE 4-year enrollment divided by college-age population is the dependent variable and the regressions are estimated by weighted least squares, where the weights are the provincial/state total population estimates. Year and jurisdiction dummies are included in all regressions to control for time and jurisdiction specific effects. In columns (5) and (6), jurisdictional linear trends and quadratic trends are also included, these may capture jurisdiction-specific labour market trends, for example. The results are generally found to be robust to the introduction of these trends.

Column (1) shows the dramatic negative impact of log college-age population on log enrollment rates. The estimated effect of -1.04 (0.10) indicates perfect crowding: a 1 percent increase (decrease) in the college-age population entails a 1 percent decrease (increase) in the enrollment rate. While 11 out of the 93 universities associated with the AUCC were founded after 1973, these were generally smaller institutions. Thus virtually all increases in college seats had to come at the intensive margin, that is, at the expense of quality as the increase in faculty-student ratio reported previously indicates.15

15In facts, most Canadian universities (58) were founded before 1960. There is no formal university accreditation system in Canada. But membership in the AUCC coupled with provincial government charters is generally deemed equivalent. Note that there are 129
In column (2), the logarithm of real average tuition is added to the explanatory variables. This yields an elasticity of -0.15 (0.3-0.2) of enrollment rates with respect to tuition, that amazingly identical in both countries. The impact of tuition on college enrollment rates is most often reported in terms of the impact of a $1000 change in direct costs on student demand. Leslie and Brinkman (1987) perform a meta-analysis of twenty-five U.S. student demand studies who seek to evaluate the impact of student responses to tuition using 1960s and 1970s data. The meta-analysis attempts to harmonize the results of studies using national, state, individual, district and institutional samples that are based on experiments, hypothetical situations, cross-sectional and time-series designs, etc. The results of most studies are found to lie in the very close range of -0.03 to -0.05 percentage point decline in the participation rates among 18-24 year olds to a $1000 tuition increase. Kane (2003) brings this meta-analysis up-to-date by including the results of more recent studies which use state-time differences in public tuition levels or evaluate the impact of changes in financial aid. As with the previous studies, the latter ones assume that the supply of college seats is perfectly elastic and find similar estimates of -0.04 (0.01). Given an average tuition of $4,000 in 2001, a $1000 increase corresponds to a 25% increase. With an elasticity of -0.15, this increase would lead to -0.0375 (-0.15*0.25) decline in enrollment rates consistent with the more recent U.S. findings. It is thus interesting that despite substantial differences in the financing of higher education institutions in Canada and in the United States, the negative impact of tuition on enrollment rates in Canada is similar to that of the United States.


16The results are reported as a 0.5 to 0.8 percentage point decline in the participation among 18-14 year olds to a $100 tuition increase in 1982-83$ when tuition averaged $3,420. The conversion above uses a 177.1 value for the CPI in 2001.
The estimates of the tuition effects are somewhat robust to the introduction of supply effects (government funding), jurisdiction-specific linear and quadratic trends. The estimates of column (5) that control for supply effects and provincial linear trends are the more precisely estimated. Both Kane (1994) and Card and Lemieux (2001b) had difficulty finding significant negative tuition effects in the presence of state fixed effects using Current Population Survey data. As pointed by Kane (2003), one problem there, as with Canadian labour force survey data, is that many students are assigned to the state or province of residence of their parents rather than to their jurisdiction of college attendance. Neill (2004) argues that, with the use of a proper instrument, this problem can be overcome and presents some estimates of the negative effect of tuition in the range of what has been found in the literature.

In column (3), the logarithm of real provincial funding per-college-age person replaces tuition and yields an estimated elasticity of enrollment supply with respect to that variable of 0.334 (0.039), a much larger value than fund for the United States (Fortin, 2005b). Given that the share of provincial funding out of the educational expenditures of higher education institutions is somewhat larger that the share of U.S. state appropriations, this result is not surprising. These results indicate that in Canada the positive impact of provincial appropriations is more important than the negative impact of tuition over the entire period.

This inference is further confirmed in column (4) which includes both log average tuition and log provincial/state appropriations per-college-age person as regressors. Whereas introducing the main determinant of enrollment demand—tuition—barely weakens the positive impact of provincial funding per-college-age person on enrollment rates. This is consistent with a larger impact of provincial funding in Canada. The more precise Canadian estimates (column (5)) indicate an elasticity of enrollment rates with respect to tuition fees of about -0.13 to -0.14.
As pointed out in Fortin (2005), the three decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were characterized by different regimes in terms of trends in higher education policies. Columns (7), (8) and (9) thus report estimates for the three decades separately. For Canada, the 1970s were characterized by steep declines in tuition and slow increases in provincial funding; the 1980s were characterized by relatively stable tuition levels and moderately rising provincial funding; the 1990s saw tuition escalate very steeply while provincial funding barely increased. The analysis shows that both tuition and provincial appropriations had significant impacts on enrollment rates in the 1970s and in the 1980s. In the 1990s, college-age population stabilized and there were severe provincial funding cut-backs, then only provincial funding is significant consistent with the enrollment supply side of the market becoming binding.

The wrong sign of tuition is reversed when tuition is instrumented with institutional student support and direct federal funding. A response of governments and institutions to the skyrocketing tuitions of the 1990 has been a substantial increase in student aid. One way for institutions to increase tuition, while mitigating its adverse impact on lower income students, is to give back some portion (as much as one third) of the increase in tuition revenues to students in the form of scholarships. These outlays as a share of the expenditures of higher education institutions have indeed been increasing over time. One obvious problem with this strategy is that it also mitigates the impact of rising tuition on the ability of institutions to supply more college seats.

Overall, this analysis shows that the impact of higher education policies on enrollment rates has to be understood in the context of underlying demographics. Similarly, the impact of rising tuition has to be understood in the context of the overall funding of higher education.

\[17\text{See appendix table A.1}\]
institutions and their ability to increase the number of college seats while maintaining the quality of instruction. The impact of financial aid on enrollment rates need to be assessed bearing in mind the possibility that it could be offset by other government cut-backs.

At the dawn of the 21st century, there is much worry about the future of higher education in both Canada and the United States (Ehrenberg (2004), Laidler (2004)). Population projections of the Canadian college-age population show increases up to around 2012 (Statistics Canada (2003)). The modest but sustained growth, coupled with a higher propensity to attend university as a result of parents’ higher educational attainment, signals a continued excess demand for college seats. Thus, enrollment demand should not be expected to become the constraining side of the market until 2025. Tuition increases are thus unlikely to be the factor adversely affecting the supply of skills, although they could undermine equality of opportunities objectives. Note that these objectives are also undermined when a restricted supply of university/college seats implies that institutions increasingly ration seats using grades, themselves linked to socio-economic status.

Arguments that support continued tuition increases point out to the persistently favourable labour market outcomes of university/college graduates. In the United States, increases in the college/high school wage premium had slowed down in the 1990s. Fortin (2005a) links this deceleration to the increase in enrollment rates associated with the relatively favourable higher education policies of the 1980s. These increases in enrollment rates translated into increases in the relative supply of college graduates in the 1990s, which exerted downward pressure on the premium. A similar inference likely holds for Canada where the near stagnant university/high school premium of the 1990s (Burbidge, Magee and Robb (2002)) was

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18I study the college/high school wage premium among young workers that are ten years away from entering college.
replaced by a climbing premium in the 2000s (Boudarbat, Lemieux and Riddell (2003)). As pointed out by Freeman and Needels (1993), the steeply increasing enrollments of the 1980s, which here are traced back to the relatively flat increases in tuition over that period, suppressed the growth of the university premium in the 1990s. By contrast, the skyrocketing tuition fees and severe government cut-backs implied stagnant enrollment rates over the 1990s. Thus the relatively stable university premium of the 1990s gave way to a rising premium in the 2000s.

Much future research is needed to assess the impact of these recent funding initiatives on enrollment rates in a supply and demand framework.\(^{19}\) The fungibility of diverse sources of funding and the extent to which the impact of financial aid is mitigated when that aid crowds out other forms of funding, are not well understood.

4. Forecasts and Policy Experiments

This section has several goals. First, we want to forecast the effect of aging on the return to university, in general, and on the return to university for young workers, in particular. This exercise is complicated by the fact that education decisions of young workers may themselves be affected by changes in return to university induced by the aging of the population. To deal with this problem, we first look at two extreme scenarios. Under Scenario 1, we assume that human capital investments (i.e. university education) of future cohorts of workers will remain the same as for the youngest cohort we currently observe in the labour market (those born between 1976 and 1980). Under Scenario 2, we assume that the growth rate in university education of future cohorts will be the same as what has been historically observed for men in all the cohorts we see in the 1980 to 2000 Census. Under these two scenarios we can use the model estimates of

\(^{19}\)Most of the research on the recent innovations focuses on enrollment demand rather than on enrollment supply (e.g. Junor and Usher (2002)).
Section 2d to forecast what will be the return to university for each age group in the future. We provide forecasts for up to 2020.

In light of our analysis of Section 3, we then discuss how plausible these two scenarios are. For example, we show what kind of education policies are required to sustain the different growth paths of education achievements assumed under scenario 1 and 2.

4a. Forecasting Future Returns to University Education

Recall from Section 2 that both the aggregate supply and the age-group specific supplies of education depend on the amount of high school, $H_{jt}$, and university, $C_{jt}$, labour provided by each age group $j$. While these quantities are readily computed within the observed samples, assumptions have to be made to forecast future values of $H_{jt}$ and $C_{jt}$ (for $t=2020$, for example). One useful way of thinking about this problem is to write down $H_{jt}$ and $C_{jt}$ as functions of the relative supply $RS_{jt}$ ($RS_{jt}=C_{jt}/H_{jt}$), and the overall working population $POP_{jt}$ ($POP_{jt}=C_{jt}+H_{jt}$) of age group $j$ at time $t$. Solving these two equation yields:

\[ H_{jt} = \frac{POP_{jt}}{1+RS_{jt}} , \]

and

\[ C_{jt} = POP_{jt} \left[ \frac{RS_{jt}}{1+RS_{jt}} \right] . \]

This means that forecasts for $H_{jt}$ and $C_{jt}$ can be computed as a function of forecasts for $POP_{jt}$ and $RS_{jt}$. We compute these forecasts using a regression approach similar to the approach used in Section 2 to compute the cohort effects in relative supplies illustrated in Figure 2. As in equation (9), consider models for the log relative supply and the log population that depend on only on cohort effects and age effects:

\[ \log (RS_{jt}) = \lambda_{r,t-j} + \varphi_{r,j} , \]
(15b) \( \log (\text{POP}_{jt}) = \lambda_{p,t-j} + \varphi_{p,j} \). 

where \( t-j \) represents the birth cohort. We can then compute changes in \( R_{jt} \) or \( \text{POP}_{jt} \) (and thus \( H_{jt} \) and \( C_{jt} \)) across time by simply looking at change in cohort effects. For example, the change in (log) population for age group \( j \) between time \( t' \) and \( t \) is given by the difference in cohort population effects for cohorts \( t'-j \) and \( t-j \):

\[
\log (\text{POP}_{jt'}) - \log (\text{POP}_{jt}) = (\lambda_{p,t'-j} - \lambda_{p,t-j}) + (\varphi_{p,j} - \varphi_{p,j}) = (\lambda_{p,t'-j} - \lambda_{p,t-j}).
\]

Since we have population counts from the 2001 Census for all cohorts up to the 1996-2000 cohort, we estimate the population model in equation (15b) for the 1916-20 to 1995-2000 cohorts. The estimated cohort effects relative to the 1946-50 cohort are illustrated in Figure 4. The pattern in these (age-adjusted) cohort population effects follows the expected path. Cohort population rises sharply from the trough of the Great Depression (early/mid-1930s) to the peak of the baby boom (late 1950s/early 1960s), followed by the steep decline associated with the “baby bust”. There is then a mild recovery (echo of the baby boom) for cohorts born between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s, followed by another decline (echo of the baby bust?) for the very youngest cohort observed in the 2001 data (1996-2000). Note that we stop our forecasts in 2020 since by this time the youngest birth cohort observed in the 2001 census (1996-2000 cohort) will have entered the labour market. Projections beyond 2020 would thus have to be based on (arbitrary) assumptions about fertility rates in the future.

The cohort effects in relative supply (estimates from equation (15a)) were already reported in Figure 2. As discussed at the beginning of this Section, we forecast future relative supplies under two extreme scenarios illustrated in Figure 5. Under Scenario 1, relative supply (i.e. educational achievement) of future cohorts remains as for the newest cohort observed in the labour market (1976-1980 birth cohort). Under Scenario 2, the growth rate in relative supply
across cohorts resumes the historical trend observed for the 1916-1920 to 1976-1980 cohorts for men. In light of the slow inter-cohort supply growth for men since the 1946-50 cohort, reverting back to historical trends is probably an overly optimistic scenario. Note, however, that this may be a more realistic scenario for women who have experienced a much steadier growth in relative supply over time. 20

With these cohort forecasts at hand, we compute the forecasts of $C_{jt}$ and $H_{jt}$ using equation (14a) and (14b). Forecasts of aggregate supplies can then be obtained by simply aggregating up the supplies for each age group (as in the case described in Section 2 where actual values of $(C_{jt}$ and $H_{jt})$ were available). The resulting aggregate supply index is shown in Figure 6a (men) and 6b (women). The aggregate supplies for 1980 to 2000 are simply the aggregate supplies already shown in Figure 3. The figures then show the aggregate supplies predicted under the two different scenarios. The figures also compare these forecasts of the aggregate supply to the trend growth in supply required to keep return to university constant. Remember from Table 3 that the trend growth in demand is about 1.5 percent a year. Given the aggregate supply coefficient of -0.479, this means that aggregate supply has to grow by about 3 percent a year to keep the return to university constant.

Figure 6a shows that, for men, aggregate supply has grown barely less than the required rate of 3 percent a year to keep returns constant between 1980 and 1980. As a result, the return to university only barely increased over this period. Things change radically after 1995, however. As we already saw, the aggregate supply grew almost twice as slowly between 1995 and 2000, resulting in a substantially higher return to university (demand outstripping supply).

20 We use the historical trend for men in Scenario 2 for women. If we were to use the historical trend for women instead, this would lead to an increasing divergence in educational achievement for women and men that would eventually become very large.
Figure 6a shows that this trend will continue unabated over the next 20 years under either the optimistic (Scenario 1) or more pessimistic (Scenario 2) scenario. As a result, supply growth will not be sufficient to outstrip the trend growth in demand, resulting in ever increasing returns to university (more below).

What account for this remarkable prediction that aggregate supply will now grow much more slowly for men than it has grown over the 1980s and early 1990s? The answer is that we are now seeing the full-fledge consequences of the dramatic stagnation in education achievement of the largest cohorts of the baby boom. Basically, the largest segment of the workforce (those born from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s) is no more educated than men born in the 1940s who have now started retiring from the workforce. Increasingly, the sole source of progression in aggregate educational achievement of men is the smaller cohorts born after 1964, which are more educated than men born before 1965. Unfortunately, these cohorts are too small relative to the larger baby boom cohorts to keep driving up the growth in aggregate supply. This explains why aggregate supply will keep growing slowly even under the optimistic scenario that new cohorts will gain substantially in terms of educational achievement. Even under this scenario, we will have to wait until the bulk of the baby boom generation starts retiring before finally seeing a recovery in aggregate supply. Since the peak of the baby boom was reached in 1959-60, it will likely take until the 2030s before we see a major recovery in the rate of growth of aggregate supply.

The situation is much less dramatic for women. Figure 6b shows that, prior to 1995, aggregate supply actually grew faster than the trend growth required to keep the return to university constant. This explains why the return fell between 1980 and 1995, as the growth in aggregate supply outstripped the trend growth in demand. By contrast, we predict that this
phenomenon will come to an end in the years to come. Under both scenarios, we expect aggregate supply to grow slower that the trend growth required for keeping returns constant. Note, however, that the difference will be minimal under the more optimistic scenario.

The story for why aggregate supply will grow slower for women after 1995 than it did prior to 1995 is related to the story for men. As seen in Figure 2a, even for women there was a marked slowdown in the growth in supply for the largest baby boom generations. A simple way to describe inter-cohort trends for men and women is that the trend for women is generally higher for women, but supply swings around the trends for various cohorts (baby boom, etc.) are similar for men and women. This explains why aggregate supply growth remains higher for women than men, though growth slows down for both men and women after 1995.

We are finally in a position to forecast the future return to university by age groups using the model estimated in Section 2 and the forecast of both age-group specific and aggregate supply. Of course, the predictions critically depend on the parameters of the model remaining constant over time. For example, if the estimated trend growth in demand (1.5 percent a year) was to fall between 2000 and 2020, this would negatively affect the forecast of the return to university.

With these caveats in mind, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the predicted returns for men and women under the two aforementioned scenarios. We show predicted returns for 2010 and 2020, along with the observed returns in 1980 and 2002 that are reported as a benchmark. Starting with the “pessimistic scenario” (Scenario 1), Figure 7a shows that returns to university are predicted to substantially grow for men. In particular, returns from men age 26-30 would increase from 0.18 in 2000 to 0.30 in 2010 and 0.42 in 2020. Returns for other groups would grow by 20 percentage points or so. While the predicted increases are very large, this would put
male returns (in 2020) at a level comparable to those for women in 1980, and around the levels currently observed for men in the United States.

Not surprisingly, returns would grow much less for women (Figure 7b) under this scenario, and essentially go back to levels observed in 1980. As mentioned earlier, the reason for this large discrepancy between men and women is that the predicted growth in aggregate supply is almost large enough to keep returns more or less constant for women, but not for men (Figure 6).

Also consistent with Figure 6, returns under the more optimistic scenario would still grow for men (Figure 8a) but essentially remain unchanged for women (Figure 8a). For example, returns for men age 26-30 would increase by 0.14 between 2000 and 2020 under Scenario 2 (from 0.18 to 0.32), compared to a predicted increase of 0.24 (from 0.18 to 0.42) under Scenario 1. Under either scenario it is clear, however, that returns for men will increase by much more over then next 20 years than over the last 20 years. By contrast, returns will remain much more stable for women, and essentially unchanged under Scenario 2 (Figure 8b).

4b. How Plausible are these Two Scenarios? Alternative Forecasts of Future Enrollment Rates

The two related question we ask here are how realistic the two proposed scenarios are in light of the enrollment models estimated in Section 3, and whether the predicted growth in returns to university for young men over the next 20 years can yield a substantial supply response? The answer to the second section is relatively straightforward. Since returns have no significant effects on enrollment rates in Table 5, it is hard to see how increasing returns can generate a substantial supply response for men. This is also consistent with most of the literature that views the effect of returns on enrollment rates as small, at best (see Kane, 1999). We thus focus our
analysis on factors like demographics and education policies that we have shown to have a significant effect on enrollment decisions in Section 3.

[NICOLE’S DISCUSSION HERE]

5. Conclusion

An important finding of this paper is that the return to university education has increased for men between 1995 and 2000 because of a sharp slowdown in the rate of growth of the relative supply of university education that started in the mid-1990s and that will persist until at least 2020. As a result, we expect that the return to university will keep increasing for men for the next ten to twenty years provided that relative demand keep growing at the rate observed between 1980 and 2000. These findings are based on estimates of the Card and Lemieux (2001a) model that allows for imperfect substitution between various age and education groups in the labour market.

The reason we can safely predict that the aggregate supply of university education for men will keep growing at a relatively slow rate over the next twenty years is that it is linked to fundamental demographic forces linked to the aging of the baby boom generation. In particular, there was a dramatic stagnation in the educational achievement of the largest cohorts of the baby boom born between 1950 and 1964. As a result, men born in the 1940s who have started leaving the labour market are essentially as educated as those who will reach retirement in the twenty years to come. New cohorts entering the labour market are more educated but too small to counterbalance the weight of the main baby boom generations. By contrast, thanks to the remarkable growth in the education achievement of women over the last several decades, the
supply of university-educated women will keep growing essentially fast enough to keep return to university more or less constant (among women) until 2020.

We then ask the question of whether the large predicted increase in the university wage premium forecasted for men will generate an important supply response. Based on our survey of the literature and new results of our own, we conclude that this supply response is unlikely to be important. Our findings rather suggest that demographics and education policies have a potentially bigger role to play in increasing the fraction of young men and women going to college and university. The reason is simple. Even if more young people wanted to go to university to take advantage of increasing returns to university education, this will not happen in a country like Canada unless more university “seats” become available relative to the size of the university-age population. This is the very reason why the educational achievement of the largest baby boom generations failed to grow, and even declined, when the college and university system failed to fully cope with this unprecedented influx of young people in the 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, the stock of human capital in Canada is not as large as it could be, and the relative scarcity of highly-educated labour will likely push up its price in the years to come. It is unlikely, however, that the price system will enable the system to self-correct itself by inciting a large fraction of young people to go to university. Favourable provincial and federal education policies are instead required to enable an increasingly large fraction of young people getting a higher education and reaping the growing benefits of higher education in the future.

References

Paul Beaudry, Thomas Lemieux and Daniel Parent, "What is Happening in the Youth Labour Market in Canada?", Canadian Public Policy 26, July 2000, S59-S83.


Marcel Mérette "The Bright Side: A Positive View on the Economics of Aging," Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), March 2002


Neill, Christine, “Tuition Fees and the Demand for University Places,” Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Toronto.


Data Appendix

The wage gaps in Table 1 are based on samples of men in the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001 Censuses (public use files). The Census samples for “year t” (t=1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000) include men and women who were age 26-60 in t. Weekly wages of full-time workers are formed by dividing annual wage and salary earnings by weeks worked during the previous year for individuals who worked full-time in the previous year. We use the CPI to deflate all wages to 1989 dollars. Individuals whose earnings are less than CAN$50.00 per week in 1989 dollars are excluded.

The wage gaps are estimated in separate regression models for each cohort in each “year”, using samples of men with exactly a "high school degree" or exactly a university bachelor's degree. Each model includes a dummy for a "college graduates" and a linear age term. The inverse of the estimated variance of the coefficient on the dummy for college graduates is used as weight in the models reported in the paper.

As mentioned in the text, relative supply measures are constructed by giving different weights on workers with different levels of education. These weights are based on relative wages by education groups estimated using a standard log wage equation with experience controls also included in. Following the literature, we first assume that workers with exactly a high school degree supply 1 high school equivalent; workers with exactly an undergraduate university degree supply 1 university equivalent; workers with less than high school education supply 0.89 of a high school equivalent; workers with an advanced degree supply 1.13 university equivalent; workers with a trade certificate supply 0.81 high school equivalents and 0.19 university equivalents; workers with a college degree (or university diploma below a BA) supply 0.58 high school equivalents and 0.41 university equivalents.
Table 1: University-High School Wage Differentials by Age and Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
<th>46-50</th>
<th>51-55</th>
<th>56-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Women

| 1980      | 0.304 | 0.452 | 0.495 | 0.502 | 0.462 | 0.612 | 0.491 |
|           | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.027) | (0.036) | (0.039) | (0.046) | (0.052) |
| 1985      | 0.303 | 0.384 | 0.471 | 0.483 | 0.420 | 0.471 | 0.597 |
|           | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.020) | (0.026) | (0.037) | (0.039) | (0.054) |
| 1990      | 0.329 | 0.388 | 0.430 | 0.460 | 0.467 | 0.494 | 0.395 |
|           | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.020) | (0.027) | (0.036) |
| 1995      | 0.320 | 0.412 | 0.410 | 0.428 | 0.466 | 0.473 | 0.443 |
|           | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.021) | (0.034) |
| 2000      | 0.336 | 0.410 | 0.439 | 0.391 | 0.411 | 0.445 | 0.467 |
|           | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.027) |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Elements of the table are estimates of the difference in mean log weekly earnings between full-time Canadian men (women) with a bachelor’s degree (but no post-graduate degree) versus those with exactly a high school degree.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group:</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
<th>46-50</th>
<th>51-55</th>
<th>56-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Estimated Models for the College-High School Wage Gap, By Cohort and Year (Men)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-group specific</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relative supply</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year Effects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz-Murphy Aggr.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.255</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggr. Supply Index</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Men with Imperfect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.547)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across Age Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-squared           | 0.94    | 0.94    | 0.94    | 0.92    | 0.90    | 0.91    |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models are fit by weighted least squares to the age-group by year college-high school wage gaps shown in Table 1. Weights are inverse sampling variances of the estimated wage gaps. All models include age effects.
Table 4: Alternative Models for the University-High School Wage Gap, By Cohort and Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age-group specific</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative supply</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggr. Supply Index</td>
<td>-0.483</td>
<td>-0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Imperfect</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Across Age Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female dummy</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models are fit by weighted least squares to the age-group by year college-high school wage gaps shown in Table 1. Weights are inverse sampling variances of the estimated wage gaps. All models include age effects.
Table 5 - Impact of Higher Education Policies on University/4-yr College Enrollment Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A: CANADA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable:</strong></td>
<td>Province Log Enrollment Rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log College Age</td>
<td>-1.037</td>
<td>-0.929</td>
<td>-0.743</td>
<td>-0.767</td>
<td>-0.909</td>
<td>-0.783</td>
<td>-0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Average</td>
<td>-0.148</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.336</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Tuition</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Provincial Funding</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per College-Age Person</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Observations</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year Dummies          | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   |
Provincial Dummies    | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   | Yes   |
Provincial Trends     | No    | No    | No    | No    | Yes   | Yes   | No    |
Provincial Quadratic Trends | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |

Figure 2a: Relative Supply of University Education (Log Supply) by Birth Cohort

Figure 2b: Relative Supply of University Education (Fraction of Total Supply) by Birth Cohort
Figure 3: Aggregate Supply and Return to University

Figure 4: Age-Adjusted Log Population by Birth Cohort (Relative to 1946-50 Cohort)
Figure 5a: (Log) Relative Supply of Men by Cohort: Two Scenarios

- Scenario 2: Back to historical male trend
- Scenario 1: Supply remains flat

Figure 5b: (Log) Relative Supply of Women by Cohort: Two Scenarios

- Scenario 2: Back to historical male trend
- Scenario 1: Supply remains flat
Figure 6a: Aggregate Supply of University Education of Men under Two Scenarios

Scenario 1: Supply of new cohorts remains flat
Scenario 2: Back to historical male trend
Trend growth required to keep return constant

Figure 6b: Aggregate Supply of University Education of Women under Two Scenarios

Scenario 1: Supply of new cohorts remains flat
Scenario 2: Back to historical male trend
Trend growth required to keep return constant
Figure 7a: Projected University-High School Wage Gap of Men under Scenario 1 (supply of new cohorts remains flat)

Figure 7a: Projected University-High School Wage Gap of Women under Scenario 1 (supply of new cohorts remains flat)
Figure 8a: Projected University-High School Wage Gap of Men under Scenario 2 (supply of new cohorts back to historical male trend)

Figure 8b: Projected University-High School Wage Gap of Men under Scenario 2 (supply of new cohorts back to historical male trend)