Signaling Games with Effective Increasing Differences
Abstract:
We identify and study signaling games with effective increasing differences. In such signal ing games\, there is an object whose ultimate value is determined by the se nder's chosen signal and receiver's chosen action\, and the sender's utilit y function exhibits increasing differences in this object and the sender's type. Many signaling games\, such as Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk games or Spe nce job market games\, have effective increasing differences\, and we provi de a characterization of which signaling games have effective increasing di fferences. We use techniques familiar from mechanism design to characterize the incentive compatible outcomes of such games. This characterization ena bles us to recover and generalize various well-known findings\, such as the significant pooling across equilibria in Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk games. It also facilitates development of new results\, such as the fact that mone y burning facilitates a substantial multiplicity of incentive compatible ou tcomes\, as well as tractable study of novel applications\, which we illust rate with an application that features cheap-talk communication\, money bur ning\, and costly evidence generation.
Organized by: Ying Gao
LOCATION:IONA 533 GEO:49.260872;-123.113952 URL;VALUE=URI:https://economics.ubc.ca/events/event/daniel-clark-ucls-micro -theory-seminar/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Vancouver BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 DTSTART:20251102T090000 TZNAME:PST END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE END:VCALENDAR