Wing Tung Lam

My research interests are information economics and search and matching. I am currently focusing on two-sided matching markets where agents compete for partners by offering contingent contracts or financial securities. I study how the use of contingent contracts affects the matching incentives and efficiency in the presence of information asymmetry.

Job Market Paper

Abstract: This paper studies one-to-one matching with heterogeneity on both sides. One side's type, such as productivity, is commonly known, but the other side's type is private information. In this market, the uninformed side posts contracts, under which the payment is contingent on the realized output. When the expected output is supermodular in types, positive assortative matching (PAM) is efficient, but it may not occur in the market described. I characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions under which PAM can be decentralized for any distribution of types. The conditions are satisfied if a higher type on the informed side always sees a larger increase in his expected payoff whenever he switches to a better partner offering a less favorable contract. This not only provides the informed side incentive to sort assortatively but also precludes poaching offers from the uninformed side. Comparing with the cases where information is symmetric or upfront payments are posted, the information rent for the informed side increases with their types at a slower rate, while the uninformed side receives a greater share of the surplus in equilibrium.

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Work in Progress
Assortative Matching And Output Sharing In Frictional Matching Markets
Monopolistic Competition With Heterogeneous Cost Of Information Acquisition

Teaching Assistant Positions at UBC:

Microeconomics (MA-level), Fall 2016
Introduction to International Trade, Fall 2013, 2015-16
Intermediate Microeconomics, Summer 2014, Summer 2015