I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Economics, University of British Columbia and I am on the academic job market this year. My research fields are Economic Theory, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics.
My job market paper is on present-biased temporal preferences.
Feel free to contact me at [firstname2006] at gmail.com if you have any queries.
Job Market Paper
Abstract: Present bias is the inclination to prefer a smaller present reward to a larger later reward, but reversing this preference when both rewards are equally delayed. This paper investigates and characterizes the most general class of present-biased temporal preferences. We show that any present-biased preference has a max-min representation, which can be cognitively interpreted as if, the decision maker considers the most conservative present equivalents in the face of uncertainty about future tastes. We also discuss empirical phenomena which temporal models like beta-delta or hyperbolic discounting cannot account for, but the proposed general representation can accommodate.
Abstract: The paper establishes a tight relation between non-standard behaviors in the domains of risk and time by considering a decision maker with non-expected utility preferences who believes that only present consumption is certain while any future consumption is uncertain. We provide the first complete characterization of the two-way relations between i) certainty effect and present bias, and, ii) common ratio effect and the common .difference effect. A corollary to our results is that hyperbolic discounting implies the Common Ratio Effect and that quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies the Certainty Effect.
Revise and Resubmit at Experimental Economics
Abstract: We evaluate data on choices made from Convex Time Budgets (CTB) in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) and Augenblick et al. (2015), two influential studies that proposed and applied this experimental technique. We use the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) to test for external consistency relative to pairwise choice, and demand, wealth and impatience monotonicity to test for internal consistency. We find that choices made by subjects in the original Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) paper violate WARP frequently; violations of all three internal measures of monotonicity are concentrated in subjects who take advantage of the novel feature of CTB by making interior choices. Wealth monotonicity violations are more prevalent and pronounced than either demand or impatience monotonicity violations. We substantiate the importance of our desiderata of choice consistency in examining effort allocation choices made in Augenblick et al. (2015), where we find considerably more demand monotonicity violations, as well as many classical monotonicty violations which are associated with time inconsistent behavior. We believe that the frequency and magnitude of WARP and monotonicity violations found in the two studies pose important confounds for interpreting and structurally estimating choice patterns elicited through CTB. We encourage researchers employing CTB in present and future experiments to include consistency tests in their design and pre-estimation analysis.
Abstract: Theories that try to account for cooperation in Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games give very different accounts of why cooperation happens. This paper proposes a slightly perturbed version of the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game which has different equilibrium predictions under Kreps et al's reputation equilibrium (JET, 1982) and Roy Radner's epsilon-equilibrium (1986), thus giving us a scope to compare these two theories in action. Based on this new game, we set up an experiment which would help us disentangle if any one of the two theories mentioned does a better job of explaining FRPD games.
Research in Progress
Sophistication in Bayesian vs Non-Bayesians (with Evan Calford)
Understanding aversion to surge pricing: an experimental study (with Guidon Fenig)
The Power of Revealed Preference Tests under Reasonable Alternatives (with Yoram Halevy, Guy Mayraz and Lanny Zrill)
Convex Time Budgets and Pairwise Choice (with Yoram Halevy)